BARBARA MURAWSKA v DISTRICT COURT KOSZALIN, POLAND

In an extradition appeal based on Article 8 ECHR, proportionality must be assessed by a careful, fact-specific balance between the strong public interest in extradition and the requested person’s private and family life. The period remaining on a sentence is relevant in absolute terms as well as by reference to the original sentence, but there is no automatic threshold at which extradition becomes disproportionate. Delay, fugitivity, the seriousness of the offending, punishment already undergone, likely early release, age, health, employment and family ties may all require consideration. A court must identify the relevant factors and explain the balance between them. Where the first-instance assessment is materially flawed, the appellate court must determine the Article 8 issue afresh on all material evidence.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against an order made by the Senior District Judge at Westminster Magistrates’ Court for her extradition to Poland to serve the balance of a sentence for low-value thefts.

The section 2 and Article 3 grounds fell away. Permission was granted on Article 8 ECHR grounds. The appellant challenged the admission and effect of fresh evidence, the assessment of her relationship and personal circumstances, the treatment of delay and fugitivity, and the proportionality balance.

1. Fresh evidence. The evidence explaining the error in the appellant’s proof concerning her partner’s employment was unavailable in the relevant sense under section 27(4)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003. The appellant was an unsophisticated litigant in person with limited English and technical skills, and the court’s post-hearing request was insufficiently clear. The evidence would probably have led the Senior District Judge to accept that the couple lived together in a stable relationship and to assess Article 8 on that basis.
2. Deficiencies in the first-instance assessment. The Senior District Judge wrongly treated the appellant as lying about her relationship and failed to take account of material considerations, including the two months and 13 days remaining on a six-month sentence, the low value and limited seriousness of the offending, the punishment already undergone by electronic curfew, the appellant’s age and health, the effect on employment, and the relationship and home shared with her partner. The approach to delay placed excessive emphasis on fugitivity and culpability. Those matters are relevant to the Article 8 balance, but they do not determine it in the same way as a passage-of-time bar under section 14.
3. Applicable approach. The Article 8 assessment required the structured balance described in Celinski v Polish Judicial Authority [2016] 1 WLR 551. The length of the outstanding sentence is a relevant factor, although the court must consider the case as a whole and must not second-guess the foreign sentence. There is no fixed “tipping point” based on the duration of the remaining sentence.
4. Fresh determination. Applying section 27(3)(c) and (4)(c), the court assessed the evidence for itself. The public interest was weakened by the age and low seriousness of the offending, the history of repeated suspension and non-custodial punishment, the short period remaining, and the likelihood of early release. The appellant had established a home, employment and a stable relationship in the United Kingdom, and extradition would cause significant disruption and anxiety.
5. Immigration position and fugitivity. The application under Appendix EU would not lapse merely because the appellant was extradited, and the risk of refusal of readmission was negligible. The appellant was nevertheless a fugitive because she knowingly lost contact with the Polish probation service and thereby exposed herself to activation of the sentence.
6. Outcome. On the unusual facts, the appellant’s and her partner’s Article 8 rights outweighed the weakened public interest in extradition. Extradition would be disproportionate. The appellant was discharged.

• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: The Senior District Judge ordered extradition on 7 May 2021.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 was allowed, and the appellant was discharged.