RASHPAL SAMRAI v RAJINDER KALIA

Strike out and summary judgment are exceptional remedies. A defective or untidy pleading should ordinarily be amended where it discloses a legally recognisable claim and raises serious factual issues. Summary judgment is inappropriate where determination requires oral evidence, cross-examination or resolution of a developing or fact-sensitive issue.

Limitation issues involving disability or discretionary extension under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 may require a trial, particularly where the claimant’s capacity, delay, reliability and prejudice must be assessed. Claims based on undue influence likewise require evidence of the transaction, impaired free judgment and unconscionable conduct. Alleged inconsistencies, inadequate particularity and weaknesses in expert evidence did not justify disposing of these claims summarily.

Seven former members of a Hindu religious community brought claims against its head priest, alleging psychological domination, sexual abuse, harassment, undue influence, financial exploitation and unpaid work. The defendant denied wrongdoing and applied for strike out under CPR 3.4 and summary judgment under CPR Part 24.

The application challenged the pleadings, the late expert report, limitation, laches, the absence of supporting medical evidence and the alleged abuse of process. The court had to decide whether the claims disclosed reasonable and legally recognisable causes of action, whether any claim had no real prospect of success, and whether the factual and limitation issues could fairly be determined without a trial.

1. Application refused. The defendant’s application for strike out and/or summary judgment was dismissed. Consequential case-management orders were left for agreement, with a costs and case-management hearing directed.
2. The late report of Dr Blyth was admitted. Although incomplete and insufficient to establish disability under the Limitation Act 1980, it provided enough evidence of psychological sequelae to assist on the summary application.
3. The personal-injury claims were plainly brought outside the primary limitation period under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. The evidence did not presently establish disability under sections 28 and 38. However, there was a real prospect that the court could exercise its discretion under section 33. That issue required oral evidence, cross-examination and consideration of delay, knowledge, disability, reliability and prejudice. It was unsuitable for summary determination.
4. The claims based on undue influence were arguable. Relief requires impairment of the complainant’s capacity to make a free and informed judgment together with unconscionable conduct by the defendant. Whether payments and services constituted transactions, whether influence was exercised, and whether conduct was unconscionable were evidential questions. The related defence of laches also required evidence about delay and its consequences.
5. The sexual-assault and harassment claims disclosed legally recognisable causes of action and raised substantial triable issues. Inadequate particulars, inconsistent accounts and missing expert evidence could be addressed by amendment, requests for further information or later permission for evidence. They did not establish that the claims were bound to fail.
6. The pleadings were seriously deficient in places, but the deficiencies did not amount to abuse of process. Strike out was too draconian where the claims were intelligible and the proceedings had not impeded the just disposal of the case to the required degree. The claimants were given a final opportunity to provide coherent amended pleadings and schedules.