WAHID NAZARI v SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

An appeal from a specialist disciplinary tribunal proceeds by way of review unless a rehearing is required in the interests of justice. The High Court should exercise restraint and interfere only where the tribunal’s decision is wrong or unjust because of serious procedural irregularity. A criminal conviction and its underlying factual findings are ordinarily conclusive in later disciplinary proceedings, subject to exceptional circumstances involving new evidence that fundamentally changes the case. Dishonesty is assessed by applying the Ivey test. Except in exceptional circumstances, proven dishonesty by a solicitor ordinarily warrants striking off, with the nature and extent of the dishonesty being the primary consideration. A recommendation by an investigator is not a clear and unqualified promise capable of creating a legitimate expectation.

The appellant, a solicitor, appealed under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 against the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal’s order striking him from the Roll and ordering him to pay £1,000 costs. He had been convicted at Lewes Crown Court of three offences, covering nine incidents, of using a disabled parking badge with intent to deceive, contrary to section 115(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.

The Tribunal relied on the conviction and its underlying findings, found breaches of Principles 2 and 6 of the SRA Principles 2011, found dishonesty, and concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying a lesser sanction. The appeal challenged refusal of an adjournment, reliance on the conviction, the finding of dishonesty, the sanction, and an alleged legitimate expectation arising from an investigator’s recommendation of a fine.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appeal was governed by CPR 52.21. The question was whether the Tribunal’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. The appeal ordinarily proceeded by way of review. The Court should show particular caution before interfering with factual findings or evaluative judgments of a specialist tribunal.
2. The refusal to adjourn was lawful. An application based on medical grounds should be supported by proper medical evidence addressing diagnosis, prognosis, ability to participate, and reasonable adjustments. The appellant’s medical records did not establish that his own conditions prevented participation or identify suitable adjustments. His difficulty in securing representation, made shortly before the hearing, did not justify an adjournment. He was able to represent himself and had addressed all issues at the hearing.
3. The Tribunal was entitled not to go behind the criminal conviction. Under rule 32(1) of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2019, the conviction and underlying findings were conclusive proof save in exceptional circumstances. The appellant’s reliance on mitigating features, the possibility of a lesser charge, and the sentencing remarks did not amount to such circumstances. He had been represented at trial and had not appealed.
4. The Tribunal correctly applied the Ivey test. It was entitled to find that the appellant knew the circumstances in which the badge could be used and intended to deceive parking officials. The fact that the conduct involved misuse of a legitimately issued badge, rather than theft or forgery, did not prevent it being dishonest by the standards of ordinary decent people.
5. The sanction was neither wrong nor disproportionate. The usual sanction for solicitor dishonesty is striking off, subject to a small residual category of exceptional cases. The Tribunal properly considered the nature, scope and extent of the dishonesty, its repetition over an eight-week period, the convenience obtained, the absence of financial gain, the appellant’s personal circumstances, self-reporting, admissions and previous good character. The repeated and deliberate deception, together with limited insight, justified striking off.
6. No legitimate expectation arose. The investigator’s notice recommended a fine but was not a decision. In its statutory context it was clear that a decision by the authorised decision-maker was still to follow. The representation was therefore not clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification. There was also no procedural unfairness, since the appellant had ample notice of the dishonesty allegation and an opportunity to respond.
7. All five grounds failed. The respondent was awarded its costs, summarily assessed at £18,000.

1. Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal: on 18 October 2021, struck the appellant from the Roll of Solicitors and ordered him to pay £1,000 costs.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974; respondent’s costs assessed at £18,000.