WALTER TZVI SORIANO v SOCIETE D’EXPLOITATION DE L’HEBDOMADAIRE LE POINT SA & Anor

For section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, serious harm is concerned with the actual or likely reputational impact of the publication complained of. It may be proved by specific consequences, general factual inference, or both. The assessment is multifactorial and includes the meaning, gravity, scale and nature of publication, the identity of publishees, and the claimant’s situation.

At an interlocutory stage, a court must assess whether the case has a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success, but must not conduct a mini-trial. Defective pleadings may be amended where their essential factual basis remains discernible. A difficult causation case, especially in an international libel claim, is not necessarily fanciful and may require trial determination.

The claimant brought a libel action concerning an article published online by the defendants, a French magazine and journalist. Following a preliminary issues ruling by Nicol J, the publication was found to convey that there were grounds to investigate whether the claimant was a spy or spook and had been involved in surveillance, data interception, surveillance of Israeli police officers and Russian interference in the 2016 United States election.

The defendants applied under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 for strike-out or summary judgment. They argued that the serious-harm case was inconsistent with the ruling on meaning, inadequately pleaded, and unsupported by evidence connecting UK publication with serious harm to the claimant’s UK reputation.

1. Application refused. The pleading of serious harm was defective because it continued to rely on allegations and contextual matters excluded by Nicol J’s ruling on meaning. The defect was remediable. The claimant was permitted to amend the Particulars of Claim to conform to that ruling and to provide greater clarity and particularity about causation of serious harm in the UK.
2. Under section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013, the claimant had to establish that publication of the statement complained of, in the meaning determined by Nicol J, had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation in the UK. Publication and harm outside the jurisdiction were irrelevant to that issue.
3. Serious harm could be established by specific evidence or by general inference. The inferential assessment was multifactorial and included the gravity and meaning of the allegation, the scale of UK publication, likely onward dissemination, the identity and characteristics of publishees, the claimant’s reputation and interests, and the inherent probabilities. The rule in Dingle did not permit a defendant to reduce the seriousness of harm by pointing to similar publications by others once causation by the publication sued upon was established.
4. The evidence of 94 UK subscribers, wider dissemination, readership among financial institutions, the claimant’s UK business interests, due-diligence systems and alleged adverse financial consequences provided a factual basis which was realistically capable of establishing serious harm. The scant documentary disclosure raised substantial causation and jurisdictional questions, but did not positively contradict the claimant’s case.
5. The court applied the summary-judgment principles in Easyair v Opal and related authorities. The claim had to carry some degree of conviction, but the court was not entitled to conduct a mini-trial. Witness evidence and further disclosure could materially affect the outcome. A formidable or fact-sensitive causation case was not thereby fanciful.

The defendants had not overcome the high threshold for terminating the claim. Strike-out and summary judgment were declined.