GEO-MINERALS GT LIMITED & Anor v GEO-MINERALS (HOLDINGS) LIMITED & Ors

A pleading of causation is adequate where it identifies the acts or omissions relied on, what would have happened without them, and the resulting loss. A schedule of loss may be read with the particulars of claim where it materially particularises that case.

Amendments do not introduce a new cause of action merely because they add further instances of an existing breach or provide additional particulars of loss. The court should compare the essential factual situations at a high level. Amendments may be allowed where the relevant facts are already in issue and no specific prejudice is shown.

Delay alone does not establish warehousing or abuse of process. A second action is abusive only where the circumstances amount to unjust harassment or a party being twice vexed.

The claim concerned alleged conspiracy by the defendants to transfer the claimants’ intellectual property and commercial rights to another company, together with contractual and professional negligence claims against a trademark agency.

The claimants sought permission to re-amend their particulars of claim. The defendants applied to strike out or obtain summary judgment, relying on inadequate causation, limitation, delay, warehousing, abuse of process arising from earlier Northern Irish proceedings, and the absence of a sufficient case against one defendant.

The court determined whether the proposed amendments introduced new causes of action, arose from the same or substantially the same facts, and whether the pleaded claims had a real prospect of success.

1. Causation and loss. A proper pleading must identify what the defendant did or failed to do, what would have happened but for that conduct, and the loss said to have resulted. The pleaded case, read together with the schedule of loss, adequately explained GT’s alleged loss of profits and lost commercial opportunities. The causation objections therefore failed.
2. Claim by the second claimant. The pleading and schedule identified loss suffered by GT, but supplied no pleaded basis for loss suffered personally by Mr Tennyson. His damages claim was struck out.
3. Limitation and amendment. Applying the four-stage approach in Mulalley & Co v Martlet Homes, the court considered whether the amendments were arguably time-barred, whether they added a cause of action, whether any new cause arose from the same or substantially the same facts, and whether permission should be granted. The amendments added further instances of existing breaches and did not plead a materially new duty or materially different loss. Permission was granted. Even if new causes of action had been introduced, the relevant factual issues were already in dispute and the defendants would not need to investigate matters outside the existing litigation.
4. Delay and abuse. The claim had progressed slowly, but the evidence did not show a decision to warehouse it. Delay alone was insufficient. The Northern Irish proceedings involved different parties, different pleaded issues, no counterclaim, and no determination of the present claims. The present proceedings therefore did not amount to unjust harassment or double vexation.
5. Strike out and summary judgment. The court applied the summary judgment test under CPR 24 and the strike-out principles under CPR 3.4. The evidence of the 5 April 2011 agreement and Mr Tattum’s evidence showed that the claimants had real, rather than fanciful, prospects of success.
6. Conspiracy. If a conspiracy were proved, the conspirators could be responsible for the totality of acts carried out in furtherance of it. It was unnecessary to plead that each conspirator participated in every individual wrong. The claim against Mr Baines therefore proceeded.