MINHAZ BASHAR v BIRMINGHAM CITY COUNCIL

For defamation purposes, the court must determine the single natural and ordinary meaning that a hypothetical reasonable reader would attribute to the publication, read as a whole and in context. The court must not use extrinsic evidence to determine that meaning. A reference to a person having extreme values or views does not necessarily mean that the person is a terrorist or jihadist. Nevertheless, context may support an inference that the person would support or advocate extremist, terrorist or jihadist action. Such an imputation may be defamatory at common law where it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and crosses the required threshold of seriousness.

The claimant sued a social worker and her employer over two statements in a family assessment report prepared in connection with child-welfare concerns and family proceedings. The preliminary issues were the natural and ordinary meaning of the statements and whether that meaning was defamatory at common law. The court was not asked to determine whether the statements were fact or opinion, or whether serious harm was established under Defamation Act 2013, section 1. The central issue was whether references to the claimant’s extreme values and views conveyed that he was an extremist, terrorist or jihadist, or a narrower imputation.

1. The court determined the preliminary issues in favour of the claimant. The First Statement meant that the claimant had extreme views, which was a matter of serious concern. The Second Statement meant that he had extreme values and views, which was a matter of serious concern. Each statement conveyed a Chase level 1 meaning.
2. Applying the single meaning rule, the publication had to be read as a whole and in its context. The relevant reader was a hypothetical reasonable reader representative of those who would read the report. The court could not use evidence outside the publication to determine natural and ordinary meaning.
3. The court rejected the claimant’s submission that having extreme views necessarily meant being a terrorist or jihadist. A reasonable reader would not necessarily infer that the claimant would act on those views. Equally, the court rejected the defendant’s submission that the words merely placed the claimant’s views at the extreme end of a range and thereby diminished their significance.
4. The report’s context supported an inference that the claimant would support, and possibly advocate, extremist, terrorist or jihadist action in some contexts. The references to serious concerns, child welfare, alleged abuse of religion, abusive messages, passports and jihadist interests reinforced that interpretation.
5. The statements imputed conduct, namely the espousal of extreme values or views, which would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally and crossed the common-law threshold of seriousness. Both statements were therefore defamatory at common law.
6. The claimant had not pleaded an innuendo meaning or the necessary extrinsic facts. The reference to later radicalisation proceedings pleaded consequence rather than meaning. The matter was referred back to Master Cook for directions on limitation.

First-instance determination of preliminary issues. The matter was referred back to Master Cook for directions concerning limitation.