Hasan Abdullah Ismaik v Fadaat Media Limited

In determining meaning in a defamation claim, the court must identify the single natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the hypothetical reasonable reader, reading the publication once and in context. The exercise is objective and avoids both literalism and strained over-analysis. Political polemic, rhetorical insult and criticism of a person’s political views are not necessarily defamatory. The question is whether the meaning substantially affects, or tends substantially to affect, others’ attitudes towards the claimant by imputing conduct contrary to shared societal values. Allegations of conviction and prosecution may carry different levels of gravity: conviction may impute guilt, whereas prosecution may convey reasonable grounds for suspicion without guilt. Curating search-engine results to promote favourable material and minimise adverse material does not, without more, imply dishonesty.

The claimant brought defamation proceedings concerning two substantially identical Arabic-language publications, one in a newspaper and one online. By consent, the court determined three preliminary issues: the natural and ordinary meaning of the publications; whether that meaning was defamatory at common law; and whether the publications conveyed allegations of fact or opinion.

The claimant relied on allegations concerning convictions, prosecution in a major money-laundering case, manipulation of Google search results, and association with allegedly extremist political views. The defendant accepted that the conviction and prosecution meanings were defamatory but disputed the remaining allegations and characterised aspects of the article as opinion.

1. Meaning and fact or opinion. The court applied the guidance in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group [2020] 4 WLR 25. Meaning is determined objectively by reference to the ordinary, reasonable reader, without special knowledge, reading the article once in context. The court must avoid literalism, strained interpretation and over-elaborate textual analysis. Meaning and the distinction between fact and opinion may illuminate one another and should not be treated as rigidly compartmentalised issues [5]-[13], [18]-[25], [55].
2. The article conveyed as fact that the claimant had been convicted in Jordan in financial cases involving petty sums. This was a Chase level 1 allegation of guilt and was plainly defamatory [28]-[30]. It also conveyed as fact that he had been prosecuted in a major money-laundering case. In context, prosecution was distinguished from conviction and conveyed reasonable grounds for suspicion, not guilt. It was therefore a Chase level 2 allegation and was defamatory [31]-[35].
3. The allegation that the claimant had used Google’s paid-search facilities to promote favourable information and minimise access to prosecutions and adverse court rulings was factual, but did not inherently impute dishonesty or deception. General reticence about an adverse past, without more, does not violate shared norms of honesty and integrity. The allegation was not independently defamatory [36]-[43].
4. The authorship allegations were principally political polemic. The reasonable reader would understand them as expressing an opinion that the claimant’s article promoted extremist right-wing Zionist views contrary to Palestinian and Jordanian political interests, and that he had benefited from Zionist money. The language did not convey literal treason, factual subservience, deception, or a failure of personal integrity. Political criticism, however vehement, is defamatory only if it crosses the line into an imputation of conduct contrary to shared societal values. That threshold was not crossed [44]-[64], [66]-[71].
5. The court accordingly held that only the conviction and prosecution allegations were defamatory. The article was not otherwise defamatory [72].

First-instance determination of preliminary issues. No appellate history is stated in the judgment.