AHN (R on the application of) v THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

When reviewing refusal of naturalisation on good-character grounds, the Secretary of State must make a comprehensive assessment of the applicant’s character and take account of all materially relevant considerations. Sustained residence with good character may be relevant, even where earlier conduct is relied upon. Earlier immigration decisions are relevant evidence but do not replace the Secretary of State’s own assessment of the whole evidential picture. A decision must not inflate an applicant’s role beyond the findings reasonably supported by the earlier material. The court may declare legal errors and require reconsideration, but British Nationality Act 1981, section 6, prevents the court from compelling naturalisation where the statutory decision remains for the Secretary of State.

The claimant challenged the Secretary of State’s refusal of his application for naturalisation as a British citizen. The refusal relied on his former membership of and alleged continuing support for Hizb-e-Islami, including findings in an earlier immigration adjudicator’s decision. The claimant argued that the decision failed to consider his long period of residence and good character, the differing findings in earlier adjudicator decisions, the historical context of his membership, treatment of other former members, and other relevant evidence.

The Secretary of State offered reconsideration, but the court held that exceptional circumstances justified determining the claim because the issues were capable of arising in other cases and had public importance.

1. Academic claim. The court retained jurisdiction to determine the claim despite the offer of reconsideration. Applying the cautious approach in Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Salem and Regina (Zoolife International Limited) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, exceptional circumstances existed because similar cases could arise and the issues had wider public importance. The lengthy history of refusals and reconsiderations also weighed materially in favour of determination.
2. Good character. The Secretary of State has a broad evaluative discretion, but must take account of all relevant considerations and disregard irrelevant ones. Twenty years of concern-free residence, together with the earlier period of good character, was plainly relevant to the comprehensive individual assessment required by British Nationality Act 1981. The decision failed to give it adequate consideration.
3. Earlier adjudicator decisions. The 2003 and 2004 decisions had to be considered together. The 2003 finding that the claimant’s position was not particularly important was relevant and could not be excluded merely because the 2004 decision was later. The Secretary of State was entitled to assess the evidence independently, but had to weigh the entirety of the material. The 2004 decision did not reasonably support describing the claimant as high-ranking.
4. Other evidence and consistency. The decision inadequately addressed evidence concerning the claimant’s peace activities, student mediation, the historical support given to HEI by Western governments, and the changing nature of HEI. If other former HEI members had been naturalised, consistency of treatment would also be a relevant consideration, alongside the claimant’s individual circumstances. No relief was granted specifically on all these grounds, but they had to be addressed on reconsideration.
5. Relief. A declaration was granted concerning the failure to consider the 2003 adjudicator’s decision and the claimant’s character over the period from 1996. A quashing order was unnecessary because reconsideration was accepted. Mandatory relief compelling naturalisation was refused: section 6 leaves the statutory satisfaction and discretion to the Secretary of State. The claimant substantially succeeded and was awarded £25,000 in costs.

First-instance judicial review. The claim followed an earlier judicial review compromised by consent on the basis that the naturalisation decision would be reconsidered. The present court determined the substantive claim and granted declaratory relief.