Sumatee Enal v Shakuntala Singh and 3 others (Trinidad and Tobago)

[2022] UKPC 13

Case details

Case citations
[2022] UKPC 13
Court
Privy Council
Judgment date
11 April 2022
Judgment text

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Subjects
Equity and trusts Undue influence Appellate review of findings of fact
Keywords
presumption of advancement resulting trust beneficial ownership subsequent conduct power of attorney presumed undue influence relationship of trust and confidence transaction calling for explanation appellate intervention sale at undervalue
Outcome
appeal dismissed
Judicial consideration

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Summary

In transfers of non-domestic property to adult children, the presumption of advancement remains relevant and must be assessed with the resulting-trust presumption by reference to objective surrounding evidence. Subsequent conduct is generally admissible, with weight depending on timing and circumstances. An appellate court must respect trial findings, but may intervene where the judge’s evaluation contains a material error, particularly when the issue concerns inferences from undisputed primary facts. For presumed undue influence, a claimant must establish a relationship of trust and confidence and a transaction calling for explanation; parent-child relationships do not automatically satisfy the first requirement. A wide power of attorney over financial affairs may be probative. A concealed sale of a beneficial owner’s property at a substantial undervalue, without consent or accounting, may justify an inference of undue influence.

Factual background

Ravi Maharaj and his sister acquired the disputed land as joint tenants in 1976. Their father paid the purchase price and held a power of attorney. In 1992 the disputed parcel was partitioned to Ravi. In 2006 their father executed a deed conveying it to family members at a stated undervalue, without informing Ravi or accounting to him.

After Ravi’s death, his common-law wife, sole executrix and beneficiary of his estate, challenged the deed. The trial judge held that the father retained beneficial ownership and rejected presumed undue influence. The Court of Appeal set aside the deed on both issues. The central question before the Privy Council was whether the Court of Appeal was entitled, and right, to interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions.

Held

  1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal was entitled to set aside the deed and was right to do so.
  2. Beneficial ownership. Equity traditionally presumes a resulting trust where one person pays for property conveyed into another’s name. Where the transferee is the payer’s child, the presumption of advancement remains relevant. The different English approach for jointly owned domestic property identified in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 had not displaced those presumptions in the present class of non-domestic transfers. Following Lavelle v Lavelle [2004] EWCA Civ 223, subsequent conduct was generally admissible, subject to its timing and circumstances. The restrictive approach associated with Shephard v Cartwright [1955] AC 431 and Antoni v Antoni [2007] UKPC 10 was not followed.
  3. Appellate intervention. The principles in Beacon Insurance Co Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd [2014] UKPC 21; [2014] 4 All ER 418 required caution, but the degree of appellate advantage varies with the evidence. Where the issue is an inference from undisputed primary facts, the appellate court may be as well placed as the trial judge. The power of attorney was not determinative of beneficial ownership because it also covered property accepted to belong beneficially to Ravi. The rents, partition proceedings, the father’s later explanation for the sale and the solicitor’s evidence supported the conclusion that Ravi was beneficially entitled.
  4. Presumed undue influence. Under Royal Bank Of Scotland v Etridge (No 2) [2001] UKHL 44; [2002] 2 AC 773, the claimant had to establish a relationship of trust and confidence and a transaction calling for explanation. Parent-child relationships do not automatically satisfy the first requirement. A power of attorney conferring wide powers over property and investments was strong evidence of trust and confidence. As explained in Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378, neither domination nor identity between the affairs managed and the transaction challenged was required.
  5. The sale concerned Ravi’s property, was made at a substantial undervalue, was concealed from him, occurred without his consent, and was never accounted for. It therefore called for an explanation. In the absence of a satisfactory alternative explanation, the circumstances justified an inference of undue influence. Equity may intervene without overt pressure or coercion; the nature and scale of the transaction may itself support the inference. The trial judge’s failure to consider the power of attorney was a material defect, and the Court of Appeal was entitled to reverse the decision.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Appellate history

  • Privy Council: The appeal in [2022] UKPC 13 was dismissed. The Court of Appeal’s order setting aside the 2006 deed was upheld.
  • Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: By order dated 12 February 2019, the court set aside the deed on the issues of beneficial ownership and presumed undue influence.
  • High Court of Trinidad and Tobago: Following a trial before Ricky Rahim J in October 2012, the court held that beneficial ownership remained with the father and rejected the claim of presumed undue influence.

Key cases cited

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Cases citing this case

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.