Kevin Stuart v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (Trinidad and Tobago)

In an appeal on factual findings in malicious prosecution, an appellate court should intervene only where a material error undermines the trial judge’s conclusions or the findings are plainly wrong. It should be especially slow to intervene where the findings depend on live evidence and witness credibility, and should ordinarily assume that the trial judge considered the whole evidence. A different assessment of the evidence is insufficient. For reasonable and probable cause, the relevant honest belief is that there is a proper case to put before the court, rather than belief in the accused’s guilt. In a proper case, malice may be inferred from lack of honest belief, and the charging officer’s malice alone may suffice.

The claimant was arrested and charged under the Anti-Gang Act after a police officer alleged that he was a gang member. The proceedings were discontinued for insufficient evidence, and the claimant brought proceedings for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

Charles J found the defendant vicariously liable, concluding that the charging officer lacked honest belief and had acted maliciously. The Court of Appeal overturned those findings, reduced the compensatory damages and declined to award exemplary damages. The appeal concerned whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to interfere with the trial judge’s factual findings. The false-imprisonment ruling was not challenged.

The Board, in a judgment given by Lord Burrows with which Lord Sales, Lord Hamblen, Lord Leggatt and Lord Stephens agreed, allowed the appeal. The judgment and orders of Charles J were restored, except for the award of special damages.

1. The applicable appellate standard was that stated in Beacon Insurance Co Ltd v Maharaj Bookstore Ltd ([2014] UKPC 21; [2014] 4 All ER 418). An appellate court must identify a material error in the trial judge’s evaluation of the evidence, or be satisfied that the judge was plainly wrong. It should be particularly slow to intervene where credibility and reliability depend on live testimony.
2. The Court of Appeal was wrong to infer that Charles J had failed to consider the whole evidence. Absent a compelling reason, an appellate court should assume that the trial judge considered all the evidence, as explained in Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd ([2014] UKSC 41; [2014] 1 WLR 2600). The claimant’s evidence and previous convictions had either been considered or were largely neutral to the charging officer’s state of mind.
3. Charles J was entitled to regard the charging officer as untruthful and as having made up evidence to strengthen the case. The Court of Appeal wrongly treated the distinction between admissions and inconsistencies as decisive. Cross-examination clearly implied the allegation of fabrication, and the Court of Appeal could not replace the trial judge’s assessment merely because it preferred a different interpretation of the evidence.
4. Malice may, in a proper case, be inferred from lack of reasonable and probable cause, consistently with Williamson v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago ([2014] UKPC 29). Given the finding that the charging officer lacked honest belief, it was unnecessary for the claimant to identify and prove a precise improper motive. Malice by the charging officer was sufficient.
5. As a subsidiary clarification, the Board approved the approach in Glinski v McIver ([1962] AC 726): the honest belief concerns whether there is a proper case to lay before the court, not whether the accused is guilty. The alternative formulation in Hicks v Faulkner ((1878) 8 QBD 167) and its approval in Herniman v Smith ([1938] AC 305) were not followed for this clarification. Nothing turned on the distinction in the present case.

• Privy Council: In [2022] UKPC 53, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and orders of Charles J were restored except for special damages.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: In Civil Appeal No P162 of 2015, judgment dated 25 July 2017, the court overturned the malicious-prosecution findings, reduced compensatory damages to $50,000 and made no award of exemplary damages.
• High Court: In CV2012-00113, judgment dated 30 June 2015, Charles J found liability for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution and awarded compensatory, exemplary and special damages.