Dr Ramraj Deonarine and others v Lauralee Ramcharan (Trinidad and Tobago)

Beneficiaries under a will may jointly vary its dispositions concerning the net estate after debts and expenses, including in favour of a third party. They have no beneficial ownership of an unadministered estate, and the arrangement cannot be immediately enforced before probate. Its validity as a contract may nevertheless be determined in an ordinary action before probate. An important issue that has been properly pleaded and fully litigated should ordinarily be decided in the existing proceedings. Requiring fresh litigation without compensating advantage may amount to a denial of justice. The Board may determine a factual issue without remittal where it is plain and obvious that the challenge cannot succeed. Independent legal advice is not, without more, a prerequisite to the validity of a compromise between adults.

Seeram Seejattan’s will appointed Dr Deonarine as executor and distributed his estate among four children. Lauralee Ramcharan, who claimed rights as a cohabitant, alleged that she and the children had entered into three compromise documents varying that distribution. The children accepted that the signatures were theirs but alleged that pages had been substituted and counterclaimed for fraud.

The trial judge declined to determine the validity of the compromise until probate had been granted. The Court of Appeal upheld that approach, while also setting aside a finding of a common intention trust concerning Laura’s Valley on the basis that the claim had not been pleaded. The central questions before the Board were whether validity should await probate, whether the Board should determine or remit that issue, and whether the alternative property claim was pleaded.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Briggs and Lord Stephens delivered the judgment, with whom Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Kitchin and Lord Burrows agreed.

1. Effect of the compromise. The named beneficiaries had no beneficial interests in the unadministered estate, as explained in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [1965] AC 694. Nevertheless, they could jointly vary the dispositive provisions of the will concerning the net estate after debts and expenses, including for the benefit of Lauralee. The limited scope of the principle in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115 and its relationship to family arrangements were explained, while the relevant power was approved by reference to Crowden v Aldridge [1993] 1 WLR 433. Immediate enforcement and replacement of the executor still required probate, but validity was a distinct question.
2. Validity before probate. The validity issue was fundamental, distinctly raised, and fully litigated through pleadings, witness statements and cross-examination. It was a contractual dispute within the jurisdiction of an ordinary High Court action. The avoidance of multiplicity of suits was a fundamental procedural principle, reflected in section 20 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act. Refusing to decide the issue and requiring fresh proceedings after probate offered no compensating advantage. An outright refusal to determine an important issue properly before the court was a denial of justice, rather than ordinary case management.
3. Determination rather than remittal. Although the Board would ordinarily remit factual issues on which the lower courts had made no findings, this was a rare case in which it was plain and obvious that the fraud allegation could not succeed. The fraud case had not been pleaded with the required particularity, its central allegations had not been put to Lauralee in cross-examination, the admitted statutory declarations supported execution, and the documents themselves contradicted the alleged manipulation. The Board therefore determined the issue without a further hearing.
4. Independent advice and alternative claim. Independent legal advice was not a prerequisite to validity for these adult parties. The Board tended to agree that the Laura’s Valley claim had not been adequately pleaded, but it no longer required determination.

A declaration was granted that Lauralee and the children validly executed the Agreement, the Deed and the Deed of Rectification.

• Privy Council: In [2022] UKPC 57, the Board allowed Lauralee’s appeal, determined the validity issue rather than remitting it, and granted a declaration that the three compromise documents were validly executed.
• Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago: On 4 September 2020, the court dismissed Lauralee’s cross-appeal and allowed the children’s appeal in part. It upheld the decision to defer the validity issue until probate and set aside the finding of a common intention trust concerning Laura’s Valley.
• High Court of Trinidad and Tobago: The trial judge dismissed the claim and counterclaim concerning the compromise without determining its validity, leaving the parties to litigate that issue after probate.