Ricardo Pinto v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council

For the six-month limit in paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 13A to the Housing Act 2004, “sufficient evidence” means evidence sufficient to prove the relevant housing offence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not mean an unspecified lower evidential threshold sufficient merely to issue a notice of intent.

The test is objective. Time begins when sufficient evidence exists, whether or not the authority’s officers have in fact directed their attention to it. A landlord’s opportunity to make representations remains important because it may alter the authority’s assessment before a final notice is issued.

Ricardo Pinto v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council was an appeal from the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) concerning a financial penalty for managing or controlling an unlicensed house in multiple occupation, contrary to section 72(1) of the Housing Act 2004.

The local housing authority served a notice of intent on 1 December 2020 and later imposed a penalty. The First-tier Tribunal found that the offence had been committed and substituted a reduced penalty of £2,500. It also held that the notice was in time because the authority did not have sufficient evidence before 27 June 2020.

The appellant contended that the statutory time limit began when the authority had evidence sufficient to issue a notice of intent, rather than evidence proving the offence to the criminal standard. He also challenged the finding as to when sufficient evidence existed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal correctly construed paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 13A to the Housing Act 2004. Read with section 249A, “sufficient evidence” means evidence sufficient to establish the relevant housing offence beyond reasonable doubt. The proposed lower threshold was unspecified and would leave a local housing authority unable to identify reliably when time began to run.

2. That construction produced a fair procedure. Once evidence is sufficient to prove the offence to the criminal standard, the authority must proceed without waiting more than six months to give the notice of intent. Conversely, it would be unfair to require an authority to serve a notice while the evidence did not permit it to be sure that an offence had been committed. Written representations still serve a practical and procedural purpose: they allow the person affected to be heard and may change the authority’s assessment.

3. The First-tier Tribunal was wrong only insofar as it suggested that the authority itself had to be sure that an offence was or had been committed. The statutory question is objective: whether sufficient evidence exists for the authority to be sure. Accordingly, an abundance of sufficient evidence starts the six-month period even if the authority’s officers have not yet focused upon it.

4. The challenge to the factual finding also failed. The Upper Tribunal would interfere with a fact-finding only for irrationality or an error of law. The First-tier Tribunal was entitled to find that, after the appellant declined an interview, the police officer’s evidence provided significant corroboration. The officer had encountered the relevant occupants at the time of the alleged eviction, rather than relying solely on their later accounts. It was therefore open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that sufficient evidence was not available until that evidence was received and that the notice of intent was in time.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): dismissed the appeal from the First-tier Tribunal and upheld its conclusion that the notice of intent was served within time.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): found that the appellant had committed the section 72(1) offence, held that the notice of intent was in time, and imposed a financial penalty of £2,500.