Mahendra Maharaj v Liverpool City Council

Reasons in a civil penalty notice must identify clearly and accurately the particular breach of the relevant licence condition. They are particulars of the alleged offence, not merely factual background. An appellate tribunal cannot transform defective particulars into a different offence. The six-month period for giving a notice of intent under Schedule 13A to the Housing Act 2004 begins when the authority has sufficient evidence to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt, including where its records already provide that evidence. On an appeal concerning primary facts, the appellate tribunal should interfere only where the decision below was plainly wrong or no reasonable tribunal could have reached it.

The appellant, a licensed landlord, appealed against a First-tier Tribunal decision confirming two financial penalties imposed by Liverpool City Council. The penalties concerned alleged breaches of licence conditions requiring annual production of a gas safety certificate and six-monthly inspections of the property.

The FTT found that the gas certificate breach actually proved differed from the particulars stated in the notices, and that the inspection breach was not excused by the tenant’s alleged refusal of access. Permission to appeal was granted on issues concerning the adequacy of the notices, the time limit for a notice of intent, and the proper approach to factual appeals.

1. The appeal concerning licence condition 1.2 was allowed and the financial penalty of £3,375 was quashed. The notices identified failure to produce a gas safety certificate by 13 June 2019, although the breach found by the FTT was failure to provide the certificate for the licence year ending 4 July 2018 by that date.
2. Under paragraphs 3(a) and 8(b) of Schedule 13A to the Housing Act 2004, the reasons in the notice of intent and final notice must be sufficiently clear and accurate to enable meaningful representations and an appeal. They must identify the particular non-compliance with the relevant licence condition. They constitute particulars of the offence, rather than merely its factual background.
3. Paragraph 10(3) of Schedule 13A permits the FTT to consider matters of which the authority was unaware, but does not permit it to decide the appeal on reasons absent from the final notice or to redefine the alleged conduct as a different offence. The defect was material because the particulars failed to give proper notice and concealed that the proved offence was time-barred.
4. Following Pinto v Welwyn Hatfield Borough Council [2022] UKUT 047 (LC), “sufficient evidence” under paragraph 2(1) means evidence sufficient to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The period therefore began when the authority’s records showed, on or shortly after 4 July 2018, that the certificate had not been supplied. The notice of intent issued in November 2019 was out of time.
5. The appeal concerning licence condition 5.6 was dismissed and the penalty of £5,625 affirmed. Applying the principles summarised in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, the FTT was entitled to prefer the tenant’s evidence. Its conclusion that the appellant had not established a reasonable excuse under section 95(4) was rationally supportable and was not plainly wrong.

• Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber): appeal allowed as to licence condition 1.2; the £3,375 penalty was quashed. Appeal dismissed as to licence condition 5.6; the £5,625 penalty was affirmed.
• First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber): confirmed both final notices. The judgment’s text does not provide a neutral citation for that decision.