Sahra Moge v London Brough of Ealing

[2023] EWCA Civ 464

Case details

Case citations
[2023] EWCA Civ 464 · [2023] PTSR 1678 · [2023] WLR(D) 198
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
27 April 2023
Judgment text

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Subjects
Housing Administrative law Homelessness duties
Keywords
homelessness relief duty out-of-borough placement reasonable practicability final accommodation offer suitability of accommodation concentric circles approach fresh evidence housing allocation section 208(1) procurement policy
Outcome
appeal dismissed unanimously
Judicial consideration

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Summary

When a local authority uses a final accommodation offer to discharge the homelessness relief duty, it must comply with section 208(1) of the Housing Act 1996. It must, so far as reasonably practicable, seek accommodation within its district or, where that is unavailable, as close as possible.

The authority bears the burden of demonstrating compliance. It may ordinarily do so by identifying a relevant procurement and allocation policy and explaining its general implementation. The evidence required remains fact-sensitive and need not detail every search or inquiry.

Reasonable practicability does not require bespoke attempts to divert social housing allocated under Part VI for use in discharging a Part VII relief duty where the authority’s policy makes no such provision and housing supply is limited.

Factual background

The Council accepted that it owed the appellant the homelessness relief duty under section 189B(2) of the Housing Act 1996. It arranged a private landlord’s offer of a two-bedroom assured shorthold tenancy in the neighbouring London Borough of Hounslow. After treating the appellant as having refused that final accommodation offer, the Council ended the relief duty and determined that the full housing duty would not arise.

A reviewing officer upheld that decision. The County Court at Central London dismissed the appellant’s statutory appeal. On the second appeal, the remaining issue was whether the Council had complied with section 208(1), including whether it had adequately searched for closer private-sector accommodation and considered housing associated with its Part VI allocation arrangements.

Held

  1. Appeal dismissed. Snowden LJ held that section 208(1) of the Housing Act 1996 applies where an authority seeks to end the relief duty by arranging a final accommodation offer from a private landlord. Otherwise, the authority could end both the relief duty and the prospect of a full housing duty without considering the statutory preference for accommodation within its district.

  2. Section 208(1), as applied in Nzolameso and the 2018 Guidance, generally requires an authority that cannot secure suitable in-borough accommodation to seek accommodation as close as possible to the applicant’s previous home or other relevant connection. The authority bears the burden of demonstrating compliance. The County Court had erred by accepting limited material which did not establish what searches had been undertaken.

  3. The Court nevertheless admitted fresh evidence about the Council’s acquisitions policy and its officers’ general daily search practices. Although the published policies were outdated and did not expressly mention the relief duty, the Court accepted by a narrow margin that the relevant acquisition practices also applied to final accommodation offers made under that duty.

  4. An authority need not give a complete account of every internet search and property inquiry. Ordinarily, it may identify a relevant published policy and explain in general terms how it is implemented. More particular evidence may be required where the circumstances cast doubt on compliance. Here, the contemporaneous searches focused on Ealing and neighbouring boroughs, and no suitable closer private-sector property was shown to have been available. The Council had therefore established compliance on the balance of probabilities.

  5. Section 208(1) did not require the Council to investigate bespoke arrangements for removing property from its Part VI allocation arrangements and using it for the Part VII relief duty. The Council’s allocation policy did not contemplate that course, and the shortage of social housing explained why it was not reasonably practicable.

  6. Males LJ agreed. He emphasised flexibility, the need to avoid unduly onerous evidential demands, and the relevance of the issues actually raised during the review. Thirlwall LJ agreed with both judgments. The appeal was dismissed unanimously.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. Fresh evidence was admitted, and the Council was held to have demonstrated compliance with section 208(1) of the Housing Act 1996.

  2. County Court at Central London: HHJ Raeside KC dismissed the appellant’s statutory appeal on 6 January 2022. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the County Court’s treatment of the section 208(1) challenge but upheld the result on the enlarged evidence.

  3. Local authority review: On 12 August 2021 the reviewing officer affirmed that the accommodation was suitable, that the final offer had been refused and that the Council’s housing duties had ended.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal dismissed unanimously

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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