London Borough of Enfield v A

An out-of-district homelessness placement may be lawful where accommodation in the authority’s district is not reasonably practicable, including because of a risk of violence and the applicant’s wish to move away. Article 2(a) of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 requires consideration of distance from the authority’s district, not a precise search based on distance from the applicant’s former home. Guidance must be considered flexibly and realistically. A lawful placement policy may guide the authority’s search. Late notification to the host authority under section 208 does not, without more, affect suitability or invalidate the review decision.

Ms A, a victim of domestic abuse, applied to the London Borough of Enfield for homelessness assistance under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. Enfield accepted the full housing duty and offered temporary accommodation in Haringey, a neighbouring borough. Ms A accepted the accommodation but sought a review of its suitability.

The reviewing officer upheld the offer. Ms A appealed to the County Court at Central London, which allowed the appeal and quashed the decision. Enfield appealed to the Court of Appeal. The issues were whether Enfield had failed to comply with the duty concerning the location of accommodation and whether its late notification to Haringey invalidated the review decision.

Appeal allowed. Lewison LJ gave the leading judgment, with which Snowden LJ and Cobb LJ agreed.

1. Location of accommodation. Section 208(1) of the Housing Act 1996 requires accommodation in the authority’s district only so far as reasonably practicable. It was not reasonably practicable to accommodate Ms A in Enfield because of the risk of violence, and she specifically requested accommodation outside the borough. The statutory duty was therefore discharged by an out-of-borough placement.
2. Article 2 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) (England) Order 2012 required Enfield to take the location of the accommodation into account, including its distance from Enfield’s district. It did not require precise measurement of linear distance or a search based on distance from Ms A’s former home. The reviewing officer had considered the fact that the accommodation was in a neighbouring borough and bordered Enfield.
3. The Code of Guidance was guidance rather than law. The duty was to have regard to it, applying it with flexibility and realism. The authority was not required to search every theoretical possibility or every property closer to the former home. Ms A’s preference for accommodation away from Enfield, the risk that a closer placement could return her to the danger zone, the transport links and Enfield’s lawful placement policy justified the decision. A properly applied lawful policy would normally make the resulting decision lawful and sufficiently reasoned. The guidance in [2015] UKSC 22, [2018] EWCA Civ 2742 and [2023] EWCA Civ 464 was applied with that qualification.
4. A point not raised during the review is not automatically excluded on a section 204 appeal. However, the court should be cautious before imposing on a reviewing officer a duty to investigate matters that were not raised during the review.
5. Late notification. Enfield breached the imperative duty under section 208(2) and (4) to notify Haringey within 14 days. The modern approach to statutory procedural requirements requires attention to the statutory purpose and to any prejudice or injustice caused by affirming the process despite the breach. The notification duty protects the host authority and allocates responsibility between housing authorities. It is not owed to the applicant.
6. Late notification did not make otherwise suitable accommodation unsuitable or retrospectively invalidate the review decision. Haringey had received the information and no prejudice was shown. The notification duty was collateral to the suitability decision and its breach did not raise a legal ground within the scope of a section 204 appeal. The issue of relief therefore did not arise.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed Enfield’s appeal on both substantive grounds.
• County Court at Central London: HHJ Roberts allowed Ms A’s appeal against the review decision and quashed it on 8 August 2024.