Verition Advisors (UK Partners) LLP v Jump Trading International Limited

[2023] EWCA Civ 701

Case details

Case citations
[2023] EWCA Civ 701 · [2023] IRLR 787
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
20 June 2023
Judgment text

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Subjects
Civil procedure Case management Employment
Keywords
speedy trial expedition case-management discretion restrictive covenant non-compete covenant restraint of trade confidential information delay serious issue to be tried permission to appeal
Outcome
permission to appeal refused
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A speedy trial requires good reason and real, objectively assessed urgency. The court must also consider the administration of justice, prejudice to other parties and any special factors, including delay. Delay is relevant but not determinative.

Employment claims seeking to enforce time-limited restrictive covenants will usually be genuinely urgent because the restraint may expire before an ordinary trial. An appellate court will interfere with a discretionary case-management decision only for an error of principle, procedural unfairness, failure to consider relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or a decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.

Factual background

Jump Trading International Ltd sought injunctive relief against a former employee and his prospective employer, Verition Advisors (UK Partners) LLP, to enforce a post-termination non-compete covenant. The covenant permitted Jump Trading to elect a restraint period of between zero and 12 months after termination.

A Deputy High Court Judge refused an interim injunction because Jump Trading had delayed unreasonably, but ordered a five-day speedy trial. Verition sought permission to appeal that case-management order. It argued that the delay precluded expedition, that no real urgency remained, and that the covenant was so plainly unenforceable that there was no serious issue to be tried.

The central questions were whether the judge had applied the correct principles governing expedition and whether his discretionary decision was arguably plainly wrong.

Held

  1. Permission to appeal was refused. The Deputy High Court Judge had applied the correct principles and his decision to order a speedy trial fell within the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. Elisabeth Laing LJ agreed with Simler LJ.

  2. Expedition requires good reason and real, objectively assessed urgency. The court must consider its resources and the interests of other court users, prejudice caused to the opposing party, and any special factors, including delay. Employment litigation concerning a time-limited restrictive covenant will commonly be urgent because the restraint may expire or substantially expire before an ordinary trial. That urgency can exist whether or not interim relief has been granted.

  3. The covenant had nine months left to run at the proposed trial date. The evidence did not establish that all harm would occur when the former employee began work. Continued work in breach could cause additional, ongoing harm. A speedy trial therefore had practical utility. The available listing did not appear to displace another trial, and the defendants had produced no evidence of material prejudice from expedition.

  4. Jump Trading's delay counted against expedition but did not determine the application. Refusal of interim relief because of delay did not require refusal of a speedy trial. The two decisions involved different analyses, and delay would not itself prevent the grant of a final injunction after trial.

  5. An appeal against a discretionary case-management decision requires an error of law or procedure, consideration of irrelevant matters, failure to consider relevant matters, or a decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. None was shown.

  6. The challenge to the judge's finding of a serious issue to be tried did not provide a ground of appeal against the speedy-trial order. A serious issue was not a threshold requirement for expedition, and a claimant could pursue a civil claim unless it was struck out. Appellate jurisdiction under Supreme Court Act 1981, section 16(1), concerns judgments and orders rather than free-standing adverse findings or reasons.

  7. In any event, enforceability raised a serious issue. The reasonableness of the restraint depended on the protected confidential information and the factual matrix. A clause permitting the employer to elect a period up to 12 months was not materially distinguishable at this preliminary stage from a fixed 12-month restraint which the employer could reduce or waive. The employer would have to justify the covenant at contract formation by reference to the maximum 12-month period. The election machinery did not make the clause obviously void for uncertainty.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused Verition's application for permission to appeal from the speedy-trial order: [2023] EWCA Civ 701.
  2. King's Bench Division: Michael Ford KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused Jump Trading's application for an interim injunction but ordered a speedy trial. No neutral citation is stated.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
permission to appeal refused

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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