Case details
Summary
Forensic footwear evidence which does no more than show that a defendant’s shoes cannot be excluded as the source of a mark may nevertheless have probative value when assessed with the whole evidential context. Its value may arise where a defined group could have caused the injury and the footwear of every other member can be excluded.
A streamlined expert report may suffice where it transparently explains that limited conclusion. A full report is required where the nature of the expert’s positive assertion makes further methodology necessary. Fresh-evidence powers do not permit substitution of an expert called at trial by another expert of the same expertise whose evidence is not materially different.
Factual background
The appellant was convicted of murder at the Crown Court at Newcastle after Daniel Humble died from a catastrophic brain injury caused by a forceful stamp to the neck. Other members of the group were convicted of manslaughter.
The appellant appealed against the admission and summing-up of footwear-comparison evidence. The prosecution evidence was that his shoes could not be excluded as the source of the patterned bruising, while the footwear of the other defendants could be excluded. He also sought to adduce further expert evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Late in the appeal, he sought an extension of time to renew a refused ground concerning bad-character evidence.
Held
Appeal dismissed. The court also refused an extension of time to renew the refused bad-character ground.
The footwear evidence was properly admitted and did not render the conviction unsafe. Standing alone, evidence that the appellant’s shoes could not be excluded as the source of the bruising would probably have had no probative value. Its significance arose from the wider evidence: the possible perpetrators were a defined group, and the shoes seized from every other member were excluded as a potential source of the distinctive parallel-bar marks.
The trial judge accurately directed the jury that the appellant’s shoes could have caused the marks only in the sense that they were not excluded. The reference to the evidential scale did not overstate the evidence. The jury were properly left to decide whether the police had seized the footwear worn by the other defendants during the attack.
The court distinguished R v T [2011] 1 Cr.App.R 9. That authority concerned a likelihood-ratio assertion without sufficient explanation of its calculation. Here the expert made no comparable positive association. The streamlined reports clearly explained the limited pattern comparison, so a fuller report would have added nothing. It was also fair to permit the expert to give oral evidence, since other defendants were entitled to rely on its exculpatory effect.
The proposed evidence from Dr Jacob was not fresh evidence in any real sense. The appellant had called an expert at trial whose view accorded with the prosecution expert. The further expert did not materially depart from that evidence. Section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 could not be used to replace a trial expert with another expert of the same expertise.
The bad-character complaint lacked merit. The appellant’s admitted kicking of a man whom he had knocked to the ground less than a month before the fatal attack was probative of the allegation that he participated in kicking Mr Humble. The prosecution case was not weak even without that evidence. There was therefore no basis to extend time for renewal of the refused ground.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2023] EWCA Crim 1002, dismissed the appeal against conviction and refused an extension of time to renew the refused bad-character ground.
- Crown Court at Newcastle: On 5 July 2022, the jury convicted Alistair Dickson of murder. The other remaining defendants were convicted of manslaughter.
Lower court decision
Key cases cited
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Cases citing this case
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