R v Pablo Jesus Belsey

Where fraud sentencing falls within a guideline harm category, the court may move to a higher category if the offence has caused a serious detrimental effect on victims, whether financial or otherwise. The actual or intended loss may be assessed by reference to money dishonestly diverted, less sums genuinely distributed to beneficiaries.

A total sentence may also reflect separate criminality on another count, even where that count is sentenced concurrently. An asserted entitlement to payment for work does not justify an executor taking estate money into a personal account without an itemised bill and the co-executor’s agreement.

The applicant was convicted in his absence at the Crown Court at Wood Green of two offences of fraud by abuse of position contrary to sections 1 and 4 of the Fraud Act 2006. He received a total sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for diverting estate money while acting as co-executor and for taking money paid for Spanish conveyancing services which were not provided.

His application for permission to appeal against sentence was refused by the single judge. He renewed that application, three days late, and sought a short extension of time. The central issue was whether the sentencing judge had erred in assessing loss, moving the principal offence into a higher harm category because of victim impact, or imposing an overall sentence that was manifestly excessive.

1. The court refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence and refused the application for an extension of time. The proposed appeal had no merit.

2. The sentencing judge made no error in proceeding on a loss of £400,000 for count 1. More than £500,000 from the estate had been paid into the applicant’s personal account. Although £120,000 was distributed to some beneficiaries, the balance had not been properly accounted for and substantial sums had been taken personally.

3. The offence was properly treated as being at the top of Category 2 under the applicable fraud guideline. The victim personal statements also entitled the judge to move to Category 1 because the offending had caused serious detrimental effects on the victims, extending beyond financial loss. The resulting seven-year starting point was therefore justified.

4. The overall seven-year sentence was not manifestly excessive. Count 2 involved separate offending and, considered alone, had a three-year starting point. It could have attracted a consecutive sentence. Accordingly, even if a lower starting point had been adopted for count 1, the judge could properly have increased that sentence to reflect the distinct criminality on count 2.

5. There was no principle requiring a complaint to the Law Society before a criminal complaint could be made. The applicant’s assertion that he should receive credit for unbilled work was also untenable: any claimed remuneration required properly itemised bills and the co-executor’s agreement.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for permission to appeal against sentence, and the associated application for an extension of time, were refused in [2023] EWCA Crim 1125.
• Crown Court at Wood Green: The applicant was convicted in his absence on 29 March 2023 and sentenced in his absence on 17 April 2023 to a total of seven years’ imprisonment.
• Single judge: Permission to appeal against sentence was refused before the renewed application to the full court.