R v Monica Williams

For inconsistent criminal verdicts to render a conviction unsafe, the appellant must show that no reasonable jury, properly applying its mind to the evidence, could have returned both verdicts. The jury may accept some parts of a witness’s evidence and reject others. The inquiry is not controlled by trial concessions, counsel’s submissions, or the judge’s description of factual issues. Separate counts may properly produce different verdicts where a common factual issue is resolved consistently but additional legal or mental elements differ. An acquittal on non-disclosure did not therefore require acquittal on false representation, because the counts involved distinct issues of legal duty, falsity, dishonesty and intended gain.

After a trial at the Crown Court at Woolwich, the appellant was convicted of one fraud count and acquitted of another. She received a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years. She appealed against conviction, alleging inadequate jury directions and fundamentally inconsistent verdicts. The central issue was whether a jury could rationally acquit on a failure-to-disclose count while convicting on a false-representation count, where both concerned whether the appellant occupied a property as her main home.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

1. Jury directions. The judge had clearly explained the allegations and ingredients of the false-representation count. The jury would have understood that a principal home and a main home meant the place where the appellant mainly lived. No further direction was required to explain matters which the count did not allege. The two counts were properly presented as separate and independent issues (para [23]).
2. Test for inconsistent verdicts. The court applied the principles stated in R v Fanning [2016] EWCA Crim 550, [2016] 1 WLR 4175. The appellant bears the burden of showing that no reasonable jury properly applying its mind to the evidence could have reached the two verdicts. Verdicts are not inconsistent merely because the jury accepts some parts of a witness’s evidence but remains unsure about others (para [25]).
3. Evidence and concessions. The test concerns the evidence and the rational conclusions open to a jury. Trial concessions, counsel’s arguments and the judge’s description of the factual issues do not bind the jury or the Court of Appeal (para [26]).
4. Application. If the jury was sure that the property was not the appellant’s main residence on the relevant date, the representation was necessarily false. It could then be sure that the representation was dishonest and intended to make a gain. The non-disclosure count nevertheless raised separate questions about the existence and awareness of a legal duty to disclose, and about dishonesty in failing to disclose. A rational jury could therefore convict on the representation count while acquitting on the non-disclosure count (para [27]). The judge was correct to direct the jury that different verdicts could be returned on the two counts (para [28]).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2023] EWCA Crim 1236, 5 October 2023: appeal against conviction dismissed.
• Crown Court at Woolwich: the appellant was convicted on one fraud count and acquitted on another. She was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years.