R v Joshua James Cameron Prescott

On a sentence appeal, a difference between co-defendants’ minimum terms does not itself establish error. The appellant must show unfairness of the kind that makes the individual sentence wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The sentencing judge is ordinarily best placed to assess what distinction, if any, should be drawn between participants.

Where the evidence gives no firm foundation for distinguishing their respective roles, and all participants joined in the fatal violence with the necessary intent, the judge may sentence them on the basis that each played a part. Conduct which aggravates a co-defendant’s sentence does not constitute mitigation for an offender who did not commit it.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Manchester of the murder of Thomas Williamson. He received custody for life with a minimum term of 17 years less time spent on remand.

Mr Williamson was attacked at night by the appellant and two co-defendants after they had wrongly identified him as someone involved in an earlier street fight. The trial judge could not safely determine which defendant had inflicted the fatal stabbing or distinguish their roles from the CCTV evidence.

The appeal challenged the minimum term as manifestly excessive. It relied on the appellant’s less serious antecedents, his non-involvement in an attempted robbery and subsequent destruction of evidence, and his assertedly lesser role in the murder.

1. Appeal dismissed. The minimum term of 17 years was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive.
2. The appellant’s absence of convictions for violence had been recognised. His conviction for possessing an offensive weapon in a public place was nevertheless a relevant aggravating feature. The judge had properly differentiated overall between the appellant and his co-defendants, despite the relatively small difference between his term and Adamson’s.
3. A disparity submission must focus on the appellant’s own sentence. The possibility that a co-defendant may have received a comparatively favourable sentence does not render the appellant’s sentence excessive. The extent of any distinction between co-defendants was principally for the trial judge, who had presided over the trial. This case did not show the unfairness required for a successful disparity argument.
4. The appellant’s non-involvement in destroying evidence was not mitigation. It was an aggravating feature applicable to the co-defendants, although not one expected to carry very significant weight.
5. There was no firm evidential basis for treating the appellant as a secondary participant. The rejected accounts of the co-defendants and the CCTV did not safely identify who used the knife. All three defendants were present and participating in the violence. Whether or not the appellant wielded the knife, he encouraged the violence and acted with the intent necessary for murder. A principal offender is not necessarily the group leader, and the judge was not bound to impose different sentences where their roles could not safely be distinguished.
6. The judge correctly adopted the 15-year starting point under Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020. The serious aggravating features required a significant uplift and outweighed the mitigation.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Dismissed the sentence appeal: [2023] EWCA Crim 1437.
• Crown Court at Manchester The appellant was convicted of murder on 16 February 2023 and, on 14 March 2023, was sentenced to custody for life with a minimum term of 17 years less time spent on remand.