R v Harry Jones

In a reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, a sentence is unduly lenient only if it falls outside the range that a judge, applying all relevant factors, could reasonably consider appropriate.

For a category 1A offence, multiple high-culpability features require consideration of movement upwards from the starting point. The extreme combination of using a large vehicle as a weapon and attacking a vulnerable pedestrian, together with serious permanent harm, may justify a sentence at the top of or above the category range. Delay caused by contesting the charge is not mitigation. Remorse expressed while denying the offence and good character have limited weight where offending is very serious.

Harry Jones was convicted at Wolverhampton Crown Court of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after Mr Tulley was struck by a Range Rover. Jones was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on 21 July 2023.

HM Solicitor General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, contending that it was unduly lenient. The central issues were the proper assessment of culpability, harm and mitigation under the applicable category 1A sentencing guideline, and whether the sentence should have been placed higher within or above the guideline range.

Disposition. Leave was granted to refer the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was quashed and a sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment was substituted.

1. Applicable test. The court applied the formulation in Attorney General’s Ref. No. 4 of 1989 ([1990] 1 WLR 41): a sentence is unduly lenient where it falls outside the range which a judge, having considered all relevant factors, could reasonably regard as appropriate.
2. Culpability. The use of a large and heavy Range Rover as a weapon, the vulnerability of the pedestrian victim and the significant planning involved were high-culpability features. Where multiple culpability factors are present, the judge must consider moving upwards from the starting point within the category range.
3. Above-range sentence. The category 1A rubric permits a sentence above the category range where the extreme nature of high-culpability factors, or their combined extreme impact, warrants it. The court considered the rubric in Fleming ([2022] EWCA Crim 250) and held that the combination of factors here justified moving to the top of the range, if not beyond.
4. Harm and aggravation. Mr Tulley’s severe brain injury engaged all three category 1 harm features: a grave or life-threatening injury, lifelong dependency or medical treatment, and permanent irreversible injury with a substantial long-term effect on ordinary activities and ability to work. Leaving the victim gravely injured in the road was an additional aggravating feature.
5. Mitigation. The delay was substantially caused by contesting the case. Jones was not penalised for that delay, but could not claim it as mitigation. His expressed remorse carried little or no weight because he continued to deny the offence. The absence of relevant previous convictions did not indicate a lower risk of reoffending, and positive good character had limited relevance given the very serious offending.
6. The fact that the sentencing judge had not conducted the trial did not require appellate restraint. The Court of Appeal was in just as good a position to assess where the offence lay within the relevant sentencing range.

The least appropriate sentence, giving full weight to the available mitigation, was 14 years’ imprisonment. The offender would be entitled to release after serving two-thirds of that sentence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a reference by HM Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court granted leave, quashed the 10-year sentence and substituted 14 years: [2023] EWCA Crim 1443.
• Wolverhampton Crown Court: Jones was convicted on 7 October 2022 and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment on 21 July 2023.