AAC v R

For offending before the Modern Slavery Act 2015, article 26 of the trafficking convention is given effect through prosecutorial discretion and the abuse of process jurisdiction. A conviction is unsafe where trafficking-related compulsion reduces culpability below the public-interest threshold, or where the defendant would or might well not have been prosecuted had the true circumstances been known.

A guilty plea creates no distinct trafficking exception, but it does not prevent an appeal where there was a legal obstacle to trial or the defendant did not commit the offences. A court may receive credible fresh evidence in the interests of justice, while declining evidence that is admissible but unhelpful.

In 2012, the appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Isleworth to 21 offences involving false identity documents and fraudulent benefit claims. She received 27 months’ imprisonment.

After the criminal proceedings, the appellant disclosed that she had been trafficked, subjected to serious abuse and forced prostitution, and compelled by those controlling her to participate in the offending. A later immigration tribunal accepted her account. She appealed against conviction and sought to adduce fresh evidence under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968.

The central issues were whether there was a sufficiently close nexus between the trafficking and the offending, whether prosecution would have been contrary to the public interest, and whether the guilty pleas nonetheless left the convictions unsafe.

1. The appeal was allowed and the convictions were quashed. The court accepted the appellant’s core account of trafficking, exploitation and enforced prostitution. When she signed documents or took other steps forming the alleged offences, she acted under the compulsion of her husband and FEO. The nexus between the trafficking and offending was clear and strong.

2. Article 26 of the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings was applicable, but the statutory defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 was not, because the offences pre-dated the Act. The relevant question under section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 was whether the convictions were unsafe. Applying R v GS [2018] EWCA Crim 1824, the court held that the appellant’s culpability had been effectively extinguished. Her will was overborne, she had no real choice, and there was no public interest in prosecuting her.

3. The guilty pleas did not prevent that conclusion. Applying R v Tredget [2022] EWCA Crim 108, trafficking cases were not a separate category, but the case fell within the recognised categories of an abuse-of-process obstacle to trial and, for charges founded on documents she had not signed, proof that she had not committed the offence.

4. The court declined to receive the competent authority decisions as fresh evidence. Although admissible under R v AAD [2022] EWCA Crim 106, they added no probative assistance. It received the remaining credible material, which supplied grounds for allowing the appeal. Continued anonymity was also justified: the appellant had statutory protection as an alleged victim of serious sexual offences under section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, and disclosure would be a disproportionate interference with her private and family life.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2023] EWCA Crim 15, the court allowed the appeal against conviction and quashed all convictions.
• Crown Court at Isleworth — The appellant pleaded guilty on 7 September 2012 to 21 dishonesty offences concerning identity documents and state benefits. On 22 November 2012, she was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment.