R v Scott Ashley Freeth

A sentencing guideline applies to an offence committed before an increase in the statutory maximum, subject to the maximum applicable when the offence was committed. The guideline is not applied differently merely because its highest range accommodates the later maximum.

A maximum sentence need not be reserved for a hypothetical case worse than any actual case. It may be selected where the offending is exceptionally serious and there is little or no mitigation. A discretionary driving disqualification is assessed by the nature of the offending and the offender’s record. An extension period must reflect the offender’s actual custodial release point.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester, to causing death by dangerous driving and doing an act tending and intended to pervert the course of public justice. He received nine years and four months’ imprisonment for the principal offence, a concurrent 12-month sentence, and a 14-year two-month driving disqualification.

Leave to appeal against sentence was referred to the full court after the Registrar identified possible errors concerning the statutory maximum applicable when the offences were committed, the sentencing guideline, the discretionary disqualification and the extension period. The central issues were whether the custodial sentence and discretionary disqualification were excessive, and whether the extension period had been calculated on the correct release assumption.

The appeal was allowed only in relation to the extension period. The custodial sentence and the eight-year discretionary period of disqualification were upheld.

1. Applicable sentencing guideline. The Sentencing Council Guideline applied to offences committed before the statutory maximum was increased to life imprisonment. Although its highest category range extended beyond the former 14-year maximum, a sentencing judge had to apply the guideline’s culpability categories, starting points and ranges, subject to not exceeding the statutory maximum applicable at the date of offending.
2. Selection of the maximum starting point. The argument that the maximum sentence must be reserved for a hypothetical case more serious than any actual case was rejected. The principle stated in Brown [2018] EWCA Crim 1774 was applied. This was an exceptionally serious example of dangerous driving, involving persistent high-speed driving, red-light offences, a vulnerable pedestrian, a poor driving record, leaving the scene and an attempt to obstruct detection. Taking account also of the attempt to pervert the course of justice, a 14-year starting point before credit for the guilty pleas was justified.
3. Disqualification. The eight-year discretionary disqualification was imposed because of the nature of the driving and the appellant’s poor driving record. It was not shown to have been affected by the later increase in the minimum obligatory disqualification.
4. Extension period. The period had been calculated on the mistaken assumption that the appellant would serve two-thirds of the custodial sentence. Because the applicable maximum sentence was 14 years, release eligibility would arise at the halfway point. The extension period under section 35A of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 was therefore reduced from six years and two months to four years and eight months.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — [2023] EWCA Crim 1754: allowed the appeal to the limited extent of correcting the extension period.
2. Crown Court at Minshull Street, Manchester — sentenced the appellant on 27 July 2023 to nine years and four months’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving, a concurrent 12-month sentence for perverting the course of public justice, and a 14-year two-month driving disqualification.