R v Michael Isaacs

An exceptionally late criminal appeal requires a good reason for every period of delay. The public interest in finality is strong, and a long extension will generally be refused unless refusal would cause injustice.

A later change or clarification of the law does not itself justify reopening a conviction that was proper when entered. The applicant must show substantial injustice. Where admitted facts also constituted a valid conspiracy to defraud, the later recognition that common-law conspiracy contained no separate head of conspiracy to commit public mischief does not, without more, establish a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant sought to renew applications for an extension of time, by more than 50 years, to seek leave to appeal a 1969 conviction in the Central Criminal Court. He had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit acts of public mischief.

He relied on DPP v Withers [1975] AC 842, which he said showed that the charged conspiracy was not an offence known to the law. He had received advice about that point in 1974 and decided not to apply for leave. He later pursued the matter after the conviction was relied on in separate data-protection proceedings.

The central issues were whether the extreme delay should be excused and whether the proposed appeal had any prospect of success or disclosed substantial injustice.

1. The application was dismissed. The court refused an extension of time to renew the applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal. The proposed challenge came more than 50 years after conviction and had no merit.
2. An applicant for a very late criminal appeal must give a good reason for the whole period of delay. The court applied R v AYS [2023] EWCA Crim 730 and the approach in R v Thorsby [2015] 1 WLR 2901. Finality is a strong public interest, and a long extension will generally be refused unless refusal would cause injustice.
3. No good reason had been shown for the delay since 1974. The applicant had then obtained advice on the proposed ground and decided not to seek leave. It was not unjust for him to bear the consequence of that decision.
4. The court also applied R v Johnson [2017] 4 WLR 104. A conviction proper under the law as it stood is not reopened merely because of a later legal development; substantial injustice must otherwise result. None would result here.
5. DPP v Withers had established that common-law conspiracy did not include a separate head of conspiracy to commit public mischief. However, the facts admitted by the guilty plea still constituted common-law conspiracy to defraud. Consistently with Quartermain, the proposed appeal therefore had no prospect of success and would have been dismissed in any event.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2023] EWCA Crim 1837, the court dismissed the application to renew applications for an extension of time and for leave to appeal.
• Single judge, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The single judge had refused the applicant's applications for an extension of time to apply for leave and for leave to appeal. No citation was stated.
• Central Criminal Court: On 14 February 1969, the applicant pleaded guilty before Caulfield J to conspiracy to commit acts of public mischief and was fined.
• Court of Appeal: On 13 October 1969, the court extended the time for payment of the fine following the applicant's appeal against sentence. No citation was stated.