R v Colin Reeves

For minimum terms for multiple murders, Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Code supplies the applicable starting-point category. Where the case falls within paragraph 2 or 3, paragraph 4 does not create a standard uplift for taking a weapon to the scene. Weapon use will usually aggravate murder, and taking the weapon to the scene will generally be an additional aggravating feature, but its weight depends on the circumstances. Sentencers must balance aggravating and mitigating factors while avoiding double counting. The Court of Appeal will be slow to interfere with that evaluation, but must do so where it falls outside the proper range and produces a manifestly excessive term.

Following a jury trial at the Crown Court at Bristol before Garnham J, the appellant was convicted of murdering two neighbours and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 38 years, less time spent on remand. He appealed against sentence, arguing that the judge had treated the weapon-related starting point as a standard uplift, had double counted aggravating features, and had given insufficient weight to mitigation. The Crown submitted that the sentence was justified. The central issue was the proper application of Schedule 21 and whether the resulting minimum term was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal allowed. The Court quashed the minimum term of 38 years, less remand time, and substituted a minimum term of 35 years, less 209 days. The substituted term took effect from the date of sentence.
2. Life sentences were required by law. In fixing the minimum term, section 322 of the Sentencing Code required the court to consider the seriousness of the offending and, under section 322(3)(a), to have regard to the general principles in Schedule 21.
3. Schedule 21 provides different starting points according to the seriousness of the murders. Paragraph 2 concerns exceptionally high seriousness and a whole-life order. Paragraph 3 provides a 30-year starting point for particularly high seriousness, with the murder of two or more persons normally falling within that category. Paragraph 4 provides a 25-year starting point in cases outside paragraphs 2 and 3 where a weapon was taken to the scene with the requisite intent and used in the murder.
4. Because these murders fell within paragraph 3, paragraph 4 did not apply. It would have been wrong to treat paragraph 4 as requiring a standard 10-year uplift in every case involving a weapon taken to the scene. The judge had instead treated the weapon as an aggravating factor. Weapon use will usually aggravate any murder, and taking the weapon to the scene will generally be a further aggravating factor in a paragraph 2 or 3 case. The weight of those factors remains a matter for the sentencer in the circumstances of the individual case.
5. The judge correctly identified the aggravating features. Some overlapped, so care was required to avoid double counting. Those features justified a substantial increase from the starting point, but not an increase to 40 years or more. The mitigating factors, including remorse, depression, assistance to the police, military service and the appellant’s eventual age on eligibility for release, collectively carried significant weight. Although appellate courts should be slow to interfere with a sentencing evaluation, the balance here fell outside the range properly open to the judge and made the minimum term manifestly excessive.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On [2023] EWCA Crim 384, the sentence appeal was allowed. The 38-year minimum term was quashed and a 35-year minimum term, less 209 days, was substituted.
• Crown Court at Bristol: After a jury trial before Garnham J, the appellant was convicted of two murders and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 38 years, less time spent on remand.