R v Jamie Martin Dunn & Anor

In sentencing for modern slavery and controlling prostitution offences, the appropriate sentencing guideline remains applicable where trafficking involves inducement, even without coercion. Duration, commercial purpose, recruitment, trafficking, leading roles and multiple participants are relevant aggravating features. An offender’s own trauma may have little relevance to culpability where the offender subsequently participates in a financially motivated enterprise. The impact of imprisonment on children is an Article 8 consideration, but serious offending may make custody proportionate where that impact has been reflected in mitigation. Whether sentences are concurrent or consecutive, the essential question is whether the totality principle has been respected.

The applicants pleaded guilty before the Crown Court at Northampton to conspiracies involving arranging or facilitating travel for exploitation contrary to section 2(1) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, controlling prostitution for gain contrary to section 53 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and, in Mr Dunn’s case, acquiring criminal property contrary to section 329(1)(a) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Ms Cojocaru received 3 years 9 months’ imprisonment. Mr Dunn received 4 years 9 months, including a consecutive one-year term.

They renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence. The issues included the agreed basis of plea, the applicants’ personal trauma, the effect of imprisonment on their young children, and the use of a consecutive sentence.

Disposition. The renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence were refused.

1. The court rejected the argument that the absence of coercion made the modern slavery sentencing guideline irrelevant. Even assuming the applicants’ submission concerning the United Nations Palermo Protocol, the judge had applied the appropriate guideline for the section 2(1) offence. In any event, trafficking is not limited to threats or coercion and may involve inducement and loss of personal autonomy. The substantial duration of the conspiracies, the applicants’ leading roles and the involvement of other defendants had to be reflected in the guideline assessment.
2. The judge was entitled to place harm at the top of category 4 and culpability on the boundary between categories A and B for the modern slavery offences. The five-year starting point was not arguably excessive. For controlling prostitution, significant commercial purpose, expected gain and exploitation of persons known to have been trafficked were category A features. Duration, the number of women involved, recruitment and trafficking substantially aggravated the offence. The sentence could not arguably be criticised.
3. Ms Cojocaru’s earlier coercion into prostitution and resulting trauma did not materially reduce culpability once she became involved in a financially motivated enterprise inducing women abroad to come to the United Kingdom as sex workers.
4. The imprisonment of both parents interfered with the children’s and Ms Cojocaru’s Article 8 rights. The interference was lawful and pursued legitimate aims. Applying the proportionality balance discussed in R v Petherick [2013] 1 WLR 1102, the seriousness of the offending meant that the impact on the children had not arguably been insufficiently reflected in mitigation.
5. For Mr Dunn’s money-laundering offence, a four-year sentence before mitigation, totality and credit for plea would have been justified even on a higher culpability categorisation. Whether the sentence was concurrent or consecutive, the essential question was whether totality had been respected. The additional one-year term was not wrong in principle and did not make the total sentence manifestly excessive.

• Crown Court at Northampton — following guilty pleas, imposed 3 years 9 months’ imprisonment on Ms Cojocaru and 4 years 9 months’ imprisonment on Mr Dunn.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — refused the renewed applications for leave to appeal against sentence: [2023] EWCA Crim 527.