R v Owen Liscombe

When fixing a period of driving disqualification beyond legislative requirements, the court must make an individualised, forward-looking assessment. It must balance public protection, punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. The court has a wide discretion, but there is no fixed formula and the period must not exceed what is necessary. A period may be manifestly excessive where it disproportionately harms realistic rehabilitation prospects or livelihood, having regard to matters such as age, remorse, maturation and reduced future risk.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Swansea to causing serious injury by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Following a serious head-on collision, he received two years’ imprisonment, a six-year driving disqualification comprising five years’ discretionary disqualification and a one-year extension, and an extended driving test requirement.

He appealed against sentence with leave, challenging only the length of the disqualification. He accepted that immediate custody was appropriate. The central issue was whether the five-year discretionary period was manifestly excessive in light of his age, subsequent maturation, remorse, rehabilitation prospects and the effect on his livelihood.

1. The appeal was allowed in part. The challenge concerned only the period of driving disqualification; the two-year custodial sentence was not challenged.

2. The court applied the principles stated in R v Morrison [2022] 1 Cr App R(S) 20. Disqualification serves a forward-looking and preventive public protection purpose, while also contributing to punishment and deterrence. The court has a wide discretion, which must be tailored to the offender and the offence. There is no fixed formula, and the period should not be longer than necessary or disproportionately adverse to rehabilitation prospects.

3. In applying that approach, the court gave weight to the appellant’s relative youth at the time of the offence, his maturation during the delay before sentence, his insight into the consequences of his driving, his remorse and his good prospects of rehabilitation. The effect of the disqualification on his plumbing business was also material. Balancing public protection, punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation, the five-year discretionary period was manifestly excessive.

4. The discretionary period was reduced from five years to three years. The one-year extension period and the requirement to pass an extended driving test were left undisturbed. The Crown Court’s order was quashed and replaced with a four-year disqualification, continuing until the appellant passed the extended test.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 12 May 2023, the appeal against sentence was allowed to the limited extent that the discretionary disqualification period was reduced from five years to three years. The substituted total period was four years, with the extended driving test requirement retained: [2023] EWCA Crim 535.
• Crown Court at Swansea: The appellant was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and disqualified from driving for six years, comprising five years’ discretionary disqualification and a one-year extension.