R v Liam Haslam

An increase in the statutory maximum sentence does not, before a revised Sentencing Council Guideline is produced, require higher sentences for level 2 or level 3 offending. The interim effect of the increase was directed principally at the most serious, level 1 cases. The sentencing judge must determine the Guideline level independently. Victims’ wishes and the parties’ agreement do not control that determination. Driving at twice the speed limit on a wet road amounted to greatly excessive speed creating a substantial risk of danger, placing the offence in level 2. On an unduly lenient sentence reference, the Court interferes only where the sentence is unduly lenient, not merely lenient, and does not make minor appellate adjustments.

The Attorney General referred the sentence under s.36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The respondent had been sentenced at the Crown Court at Nottingham to 32 months’ detention for causing death by dangerous driving, with a concurrent sentence of 14 months for causing serious injury by dangerous driving.

The Solicitor General argued that the statutory increase introduced by section 86(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 should affect level 2 and level 3 sentences, and that the offending was level 2 rather than high level 3. The respondent argued that any adjustment should await the Sentencing Council’s revised Guideline and that the sentence was not unduly lenient. The central issues were the interim effect of the statutory increase and the correct Guideline level.

1. Leave and disposition. The court granted leave for the Attorney General’s reference but dismissed it. The sentence was lenient, but not unduly lenient.
2. Effect of the statutory increase. Section 86(2) of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 increased the maximum sentence for causing death by dangerous driving from 14 years to life imprisonment. The explanatory notes indicated that the change was directed at the most serious cases. The court accepted that legislative increases must be taken into account, as explained in R v Richardson & Ors [2006] EWCA Crim 3186; [2007] 2 Cr App R(S) 36. However, pending the Sentencing Council’s review and revised Guideline, the court followed the approach in R v Soto [2023] EWCA Crim 55: sentences for level 2 and level 3 offending should not be increased by reason of the statutory change.
3. Guideline classification. The judge was not bound by the victims’ wishes, the offender’s desire for imprisonment, or the parties’ agreement that the offending was level 2. The judge had to determine the level independently. Driving at 61 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone on a wet road was greatly excessive speed and created a substantial risk of danger. The offence was therefore level 2, not level 3. No other feature independently required that classification.
4. Sentence and totality. The aggravating features included ignoring previous speed warnings, consuming cannabis, and causing serious injury to the second victim. The judge properly applied totality by adding one year for that separate harm rather than simply aggregating the sentences. The resulting five-year sentence before mitigation and guilty-plea credit was generous, but any adjustment would have involved impermissible appellate tinkering. The statutory threshold for intervention was not met.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — On a reference under s.36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, leave was granted but the Reference was dismissed: [2023] EWCA Crim 661.
• Crown Court at Nottingham — On 24 February 2023, the respondent was sentenced to 32 months’ detention for causing death by dangerous driving, with a concurrent 14-month sentence for causing serious injury by dangerous driving.