R v Penelope Jackson

A loss of control need not be sudden. It may arise from the cumulative effect of a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, provided the statutory requirements are met. A jury direction is adequate where it fairly directs the jury to assess the alleged loss of control in the context of the relationship as a whole.

The prosecution is not obliged to call witnesses whose statements have never formed part of its case, where their material has been properly disclosed and the defence can call them. Whether publication of trial evidence should be postponed is fact-specific; absent evidence of prejudice, appropriate judicial directions may suffice to protect trial fairness.

The applicant was convicted at Bristol Crown Court of murdering her husband and was sentenced to life imprisonment with an 18-year minimum term pursuant to section 322 of the Sentencing Act 2020. She renewed an application for permission to appeal after refusal by a single judge.

She accepted responsibility for the killing but relied on lack of intent and the partial defence of loss of control. She alleged a long history of domestic abuse, including coercive and controlling behaviour. Her appeal challenged the judge’s directions, the prosecution’s decision not to call disclosed witnesses, and the release to the press during trial of digital evidence that had been played to the jury.

The central issue was whether any of those matters rendered the murder conviction arguably unsafe.

Disposition

The renewed application for permission to appeal was dismissed. None of the four grounds, alone or cumulatively, disclosed a material irregularity or a basis to challenge the safety of the conviction.

1. A loss of control need not be sudden and may be triggered by the cumulative impact of events, particularly within a coercive and controlling relationship. The judge had clearly directed the jury to assess the events of the killing against the longer history of alleged physical and mental abuse, control, isolation, belittling and mistreatment. The direction did not over-emphasise violence. Whether the applicant’s account was accepted and, if so, established the defence remained for the jury.

2. The judge was entitled to summarise the prosecution case as alleging exaggeration of the level and frequency of abuse. That characterisation fairly reflected the prosecution opening, its evidence and the cross-examination considered as a whole. The judge also fairly put the defence case.

3. The prosecution had properly exercised its discretion not to rely on witnesses whose statements had not formed part of its case. The principles in R v Russell-Jones [1995] 1 Cr App R 538 remained compatible with the overriding objective of the Criminal Procedure Rules. Proper disclosure enabled the defence to call the witnesses, and it called two of them. The judge also correctly declined to call witnesses himself: the power identified in R v Roberts (1985) 80 Cr App R 89 is to be exercised carefully and sparingly.

4. Whether publication should be postponed under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 depends on the facts of the particular case. The judge was entitled to permit release of footage already played in court, having directed the jury about it. There was no evidence that jurors or defence witnesses saw or were influenced by adverse online material; alleged prejudice was speculative.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for permission to appeal conviction was dismissed: [2023] EWCA Crim 735. A single judge had previously refused permission.
• Crown Court at Bristol: The applicant was convicted of murder by a majority of 10:2 and sentenced to life imprisonment with an 18-year minimum term.