R v Rachel Barnes

A conviction following a guilty plea will be quashed only in limited circumstances. Incorrect legal advice may make the plea a nullity if it was not a true acknowledgment of guilt. Even where the plea remains valid, the conviction may be quashed if the advice deprived the defendant of a defence that would probably have succeeded. For stalking under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, actual knowledge that conduct will cause serious alarm or distress is unnecessary; knowledge or constructive knowledge judged by what a reasonable person would think is sufficient. Sentencing categorisation and suspension of imprisonment remain matters for the trial judge’s discretion. Restraining orders should have finite duration and clear prohibitions.

The applicant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Swindon to stalking offences against three people. The principal count was stalking involving serious alarm or distress under section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; she pleaded to lesser stalking offences under section 2A on two other counts. She received 18 months’ imprisonment and a restraining order.

She sought extensions of time and permission to appeal against conviction and sentence, alleging an equivocal plea, incorrect legal advice, excessive sentence, failure to suspend imprisonment and disproportionate terms in the restraining order. She also sought to adduce fresh evidence. The central issues were whether the guilty pleas could be impugned, whether the sentence was unlawful or manifestly excessive, and whether the restraining order required amendment.

The applications concerning conviction and imprisonment were refused. Leave was granted only in relation to the restraining order, which was varied.

1. Conviction. A guilty plea is ordinarily a public admission of the facts constituting the offence. Applying the principles in R v Tredget [2022] 4 WLR 62, incorrect legal advice could justify quashing the conviction if the plea was not a true acknowledgment of guilt, or if the advice deprived the defendant of a defence which would probably have succeeded. The applicant’s remorse, admissions and other evidence showed that she understood and accepted the conduct. Neither limb was met. The possible defences had, at most, a remote prospect of success.
2. Stalking offence. Section 4A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 did not require actual knowledge that the conduct would cause serious alarm or distress. It was sufficient that the defendant knew or ought to have known this, judged by what a reasonable person would think. The planned and prolonged conduct made the proposed defence particularly unlikely to succeed.
3. Sentence. The Category 1B classification was justified by persistent conduct over a long period, significant planning and conduct intended to maximise fear and distress. The victim personal statements, supported by statements made during or shortly after the offending, provided a satisfactory foundation for Category 1 harm. The sentence was below the guideline starting point, reflected the overall criminality of all three offences, and was within the sentencing judge’s discretion. The decision not to suspend imprisonment was likewise not manifestly excessive.
4. Restraining order. The order required amendment to meet the requirements identified in Debnath [2005] EWCA Crim 3472. It was limited to five years, the word reasonably was removed from paragraph 2, the surveillance prohibition was clarified, and the prohibition on false complaints or reports was revised.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2023] EWCA Crim 761. Time was not extended and permission was refused for the conviction and imprisonment challenges. Leave was granted concerning the restraining order, which was amended.
• Crown Court at Swindon: The applicant pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, with concurrent sentences on the other counts, together with a restraining order.