R v Steven Paul Craig

A murder committed after a delay between the causative act and the victim’s death is committed when all its elements, including death, are proved. The offence date is therefore the date of death, so applying the current sentencing regime does not offend Article 7.1. Under paragraph 3(1) of the Sentencing Code, the 30-year starting point depends on a fact-sensitive assessment of whether seriousness is particularly high. The assessment is not confined to the listed examples. A murder sentence must be assessed independently of an earlier sentence for a different offence, although the earlier sentence may be reflected in a later adjustment. Statutory custody credit applies only to custody pursuant to a court order.

The appellant had been convicted in 2000 of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to Jacqueline Kirk and of separate offences against another partner. He received life sentences with a minimum term of nine years. Kirk died in 2019 from complications substantially caused by the injuries inflicted in 1998. The appellant was convicted of murder and, on 10 November 2022, was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 15 years and five days, after a 34-year term was reduced by credit for earlier custody.

He appealed on the grounds that the offence was committed in 1998, that the 30-year starting point was excessive, that aggravating factors had been double-counted, and that insufficient mitigation had been allowed. The central issues were the offence date, the application of the transitional provisions and the proper assessment of the murder sentence.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The minimum term of 15 years and five days was not manifestly excessive.
2. Murder requires an unlawful killing. Death is therefore an essential element, and the offence cannot be committed until all its elements have been proved. The relevant date was Kirk’s death on 23 August 2019, not the infliction of the injuries in 1998. The court distinguished the position in R v Wright and Hennessy [2022] EWCA Crim 68, where the date issue had not been argued and had been academic on the facts. The current sentencing regime did not breach Article 7.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The lapse between injury and death could instead be reflected in culpability and aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
3. The 30-year starting point under paragraph 3(1) of the Sentencing Code required a fact-sensitive assessment of whether the seriousness of the offence was particularly high. The examples in paragraph 3(2) were not exhaustive. The planned and premeditated attack, its sadistic nature and the appellant’s awareness of the danger involved in using petrol justified that starting point. The pattern of domestic abuse, the victim’s vulnerability, the abuse of trust, the appellant’s drunkenness, his failure to assist, the extreme suffering and the effect on the family justified a substantial uplift. R v Dunstan [2016] EWCA Crim 2098 was distinguishable because its facts were materially different.
4. The judge had to sentence for murder. The earlier sentence for grievous bodily harm was relevant only after the correct murder minimum term had been assessed. Factors relevant to the murder were not excluded merely because they might have been considered in 2000. That was not double counting, since the later sentence concerned a different offence.
5. The weight given to mitigation was a matter for the sentencing judge. The court could not interfere without concluding that the assessment was wrong. It was satisfied that the aggravating and mitigating factors had been properly considered.
6. Sections 240 ZA and 241 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 concerned custody pursuant to a remand or committal order. They did not cover detention after expiry of the minimum term while release was considered by the Parole Board, or detention following recall. The judge nevertheless had an exceptional discretion to go beyond the statutory regime, as recognised in R v Wright and Hennessy [2022] EWCA Crim 68. The court was not asked to review that discretion. It observed that credit for custody attributable to separate offending should not reduce the murder term and that credit for recalled custody was arguable.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The appeal against sentence was dismissed: [2023] EWCA Crim 893.
2. Crown Court at Bristol — Following the appellant’s murder conviction, the court imposed life imprisonment with a minimum term of 15 years and five days on 10 November 2022.