R v Kieron Mark Webster

A sentence disparity provides a ground for appellate intervention only where it is unfair and inexplicable, so that a properly informed observer would conclude that the sentencing process went wrong. Differences in prior serious offending, offending committed while serving a related sentence, intensity of criminal activity, and other aggravating features may justify equivalent starting points for co-defendants whose roles and drug quantities differ.

In a drug conspiracy, exact quantity may be incapable of proof. A modest difference in estimated quantity will not make a sentence wrong in principle where it does not affect the applicable sentencing category and the estimate is supported by the evidence. A late plea entered during trial may properly attract less than 10 per cent credit, even if the jury has not yet been sworn.

R v Kieron Mark Webster concerned a renewed application for leave to appeal against a sentence imposed in the Crown Court at Preston. The applicant received 17 years and one month’s imprisonment for conspiracies to supply cocaine and cannabis after pleading guilty on the second day of trial.

He challenged the sentence on three grounds: unfair disparity with sentences imposed on two co-defendants; an alleged overstatement of the cocaine quantity; and insufficient credit for his late guilty pleas. The central issue was whether the sentence was arguably excessive or wrong in principle.

1. The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused. The sentence of 17 years and one month was just and proportionate, and was neither excessive nor wrong in principle.
2. There was no unfair disparity. Such a challenge succeeds only where disparity is unfair and inexplicable, such that a properly informed observer would conclude that something had gone wrong in the sentencing process. The applicant’s involvement had begun while he was serving a substantial sentence for a similar drug conspiracy. His previous serious offending, the use of his cousin to continue the operation before release, and the intensity of his activity justified the same 18-year pre-plea starting point as that adopted for the principal co-defendants. Their lesser criminal records and earlier guilty pleas also explained their lower final sentences (paras [29]–[30]).
3. The judge was entitled to proceed on an attribution of five kilograms of cocaine. In a conspiracy, precision as to quantity may be impossible. The distinction between four and five kilograms was insignificant because the case remained within category 1. The evidence supported at least three kilograms after release and a significant further quantity before release. The applicant had declined to provide a written basis of plea so that his challenge could be tested at a Newton hearing (paras [31]–[32]).
4. The cocaine conspiracy fell within the 12-to-16-year category 1A range under the Sentencing Council guideline, but the aggravating circumstances justified a starting point above it. The concurrent cannabis sentence was also properly reflected in the overall sentence (paras [33]–[34]).
5. Five per cent credit for plea was proper. The relevant guideline permits a maximum 10 per cent credit for a plea on the first day of trial, with a normally lower reduction for a plea entered during trial. The applicant pleaded only on the second day, after the first jury had been discharged and a fresh jury was about to be sworn (paras [35]–[36]).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed application for leave to appeal against sentence refused in R v Kieron Mark Webster, [2023] EWCA Crim 966.
• Crown Court at Preston: on 13 February 2023, HHJ Archer imposed a total sentence of 17 years and one month’s imprisonment for conspiracies to supply cocaine and cannabis.