R v Adris Mohammed

For murder based on tying up and abandoning a victim, the relevant mens rea is the defendant’s intention when the victim was restrained. The precise time of death, or whether the victim remained conscious or alive when the defendant left, need not be a separate step in the route to verdict where those matters form only part of the defence case. Evidence before, during and after the restraint may support an inference of murderous intent and enable the jury to reject alternative scenarios as speculative or unsupported. On sentence, deliberate restraint, some pre-planning, the victim’s vulnerability and possible prolonged suffering may increase seriousness even where the duration of suffering is uncertain.

The applicant was convicted at Birmingham Crown Court of murder, attempted burglary, two burglaries and two counts of fraud by false representation. He received a life sentence for murder with a minimum term of 33 years, together with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

He renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction for murder and against sentence. The conviction grounds concerned the sufficiency of the evidence of murderous intent and the judge’s directions concerning whether the deceased was alive or conscious when the applicant left. The sentence grounds challenged findings of intention to kill, premeditation and suffering. The central issues were whether the murder charge should have been withdrawn from the jury and whether the minimum term was manifestly excessive.

The court refused leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.

1. No case to answer. The evidence provided a solid basis on which a properly directed jury could infer that the applicant tied the deceased to a chair intending that he should die there. Evidence concerning the purpose of the binding, the applicant’s use of the deceased’s bank card over the following days, and his failure to summon help when he returned supported that inference. The jury were entitled to reject the suggested alternative scenarios as speculative, fanciful or unsupported. The relevant point at which the applicant had to possess the intention for murder was when he tied up the deceased.
2. Jury directions. The precise time of death was not the issue for the jury. It was unnecessary to direct the jury as a separate route-to-verdict question to determine whether the deceased remained conscious after being tied up, or was alive when the applicant left and believed to be alive. Those matters were arguments forming part of the defence case. The proper question was whether, by tying up the deceased and leaving him in that state, the applicant intended to kill him or cause really serious injury.
3. Sentence. The sentencing judge was entitled to find an intention to kill and therefore reject mitigation based on the absence of such an intention. He was also entitled to find some pre-planning in the deliberate act of tying the deceased, even though there was no premeditation when the burglary began. The uncertainty as to how long the deceased remained alive and conscious did not prevent the judge from treating the manner of treatment and the suffering it must have caused as increasing the seriousness of the offence.
4. Disposition. The 33-year minimum term was not manifestly excessive. The renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — In [2023] EWCA Crim 974, the renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused.
2. Single judge — Applications for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence were refused on the papers.
3. Crown Court at Birmingham — The applicant was convicted on 18 May 2022 and sentenced on 9 June 2022 to life imprisonment for murder, with a minimum term of 33 years and concurrent sentences for the remaining offences.