Esengul Woodcock v The Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police

The police do not owe a general civil-law duty to protect members of the public from third-party criminal acts, but a limited duty to warn may arise where (1) the risk of serious harm to an identifiable individual is foreseeable and imminent, (2) the perpetrator's actions and words identify a focused threat, (3) there is close proximity in dealings between police, victim and perpetrator, (4) the police have by words or conduct assumed responsibility to the victim, and (5) public policy does not outweigh imposing liability. On those facts, an urgent neighbour's report that the assailant is loitering outside a victim's home can attract a duty to telephone and warn the victim.

The claimant brought tort claims against the police for failing to protect or warn her before she was stabbed repeatedly by a former partner. The trial judge dismissed the action. On appeal the High Court examined the established authorities on the police's duty in omissions cases, including [1989] AC 53, [2015] UKSC 2 and [2018] UKSC 4, reviewed operational guidance and IPCC findings, and considered whether a neighbour's 999 report that the perpetrator was loitering outside the claimant's house shortly before she left for work created a duty to warn. The court allowed the appeal on the legal point that a duty to warn arose in the specific circumstances and remitted the question of causation to the trial judge for further evidence.

1. Disposition. The appeal is allowed on the question of whether a duty to warn arose; the judge below was wrong to dismiss that pleaded duty. The court remits the causation issue to the trial judge for further evidence under CPR r.52.20(2)(b) and will deal with consequential matters after submissions or at short hearing. (paras 121–122)
2. Principles governing police omissions. The court restated that the general law of negligence applies to the police; there is no blanket immunity. However, absent special circumstances (such as assumption of responsibility or control of the danger), the police are not normally under a civil-law duty to protect individuals from harms caused by third parties. Authorities such as [1989] AC 53, [2008] UKHL 50, [2015] UKSC 2 and [2018] UKSC 4 set the boundaries and describe limited exceptions. (paras 16–31; 22–26; 28–31)
3. Exceptions and factors to consider. The court identified the relevant factors to engage an exception to Hill-style rule: (a) foreseeability and seriousness of harm to an identifiable person; (b) the reported acts and words of the suspected perpetrator evidencing focused danger; (c) the course of dealings and proximity between police, victim and perpetrator; (d) any express or implied representations or conduct by the police amounting to an assumption of responsibility; and (e) whether public policy reasons against imposing liability are outweighed. These factors require close factual analysis in each case. (paras 49–51; 99–112)
4. Application to the present facts — duty to warn. Applying those factors, the court found special and exceptional circumstances: the police knew of repeated breaches of bail, recent recorded threats to kill and threats to rape the claimant's children, repeated attempts to enter the claimant's home, a safety plan asking neighbours to look out, an IPCC finding that the case should have been risk-graded as high, and an immediate neighbour 999 call at 07:32 stating the perpetrator was loitering one house away shortly before the claimant would leave for work. Those circumstances created both (i) a limited duty to telephone and warn the claimant once the neighbour's report was received and (ii) an assumption of responsibility to warn in the circumstances. (paras 100–114)
5. Breach. The court held that the police breached any such duty by failing, as an organisation, to pass on the neighbour's urgent report and call the claimant before officers arrived. Organisational shortcomings in procedures or training do not excuse non-performance of the duty; those shortcomings can constitute or contribute to breach. (paras 114–115)
6. Causation/remedy. The trial judge found there was insufficient evidence that, had the claimant been warned, she would have acted differently; the Court of Appeal (this court exercising appellate powers) considered the evidential record on causation insufficiently explored at trial and remitted causation for further factual inquiry under CPR r.52.20(2)(b). The substantive civil claim is therefore not finally resolved as to damages. (paras 116–120)
7. Policy observations. The court considered and rejected the argument that imposing a narrow duty to warn in such narrowly-defined circumstances would undermine policing operations or generate a flood of litigation; instead it concluded that passing on an urgent neighbour report to the threatened individual imposes negligible burden and promotes rather than undermines policing and public confidence. The IPCC recommendation to improve threat-to-life warning procedures supported the conclusion. (paras 109–111; 92–93)
8. Orders. Appeal allowed on liability to warn; causation remitted to the trial judge for further evidence; consequential orders and costs reserved pending written submissions or short hearing. (paras 121–122)