Braintree District Council v Secretary of State for the Home Office & Anor

Section 296A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 prevents a local planning authority from bringing section 187B injunction proceedings concerning Crown land without the appropriate authority’s consent. The prohibition covers court proceedings and applications brought for enforcement purposes, including applications to restrain actual or apprehended breaches of planning control.

Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 is not confined to sudden or unforeseen events. A developing situation may constitute an emergency where it threatens serious damage to human welfare, including homelessness. The reference to damage “in a place” may encompass multiple locations. The development need only reduce, control or mitigate the emergency; it need not prevent or remedy it entirely.

Braintree District Council sought an injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to restrain the proposed use of Crown land at RAF Wethersfield for accommodation for up to 1,700 male asylum seekers.

The defendants contended that section 296A deprived the court of jurisdiction because the proposed development concerned Crown land. They also contended that the development was permitted under Class Q of Part 19 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, as action connected with an emergency threatening serious damage to human welfare through homelessness.

The central issues were whether the injunction proceedings were prohibited by section 296A and, if not, whether the proposed development fell within Class Q.

1. Jurisdiction. The claim was struck out. Section 296A(2) prohibits a local planning authority from taking enforcement steps concerning Crown land without the appropriate authority’s consent. Section 296A(4) gives a broad definition of enforcement. Section 296A(5) expressly includes bringing proceedings and making an application.
2. An application under section 187B is a step taken for enforcement purposes. It seeks to restrain an actual or apprehended breach of planning control arising from the statutory requirement in section 57 to obtain planning permission. The fact that section 187B concerns apprehended breaches, and the absence of an express reference to section 187B in section 296A, did not alter that conclusion. The former section 296 had specifically excluded injunctions against the Crown, whereas section 296A used generic descriptions of prohibited enforcement steps.
3. Class Q. Although unnecessary to the result, the court determined the point. “Emergency” has the meaning supplied by Class Q itself and should not be confined by dictionary glosses to sudden, unexpected or natural disasters. A situation which develops over time may qualify.
4. The unprecedented number of asylum seekers requiring accommodation, combined with insufficient sustainable accommodation, constituted a situation threatening serious damage to human welfare because it involved or might cause homelessness in significant numbers. The reference to damage to human welfare “in a place” could include multiple locations within the United Kingdom.
5. The proposed development was for the purpose of reducing, controlling or mitigating the emergency. Class Q did not require the development to prevent or remedy the emergency entirely, nor did the existence of other possible mitigation prevent its application. The twelve-month limit reinforced the temporary nature of the permitted development right.
6. Whether the Class Q conditions were met involved legal analysis and statutory interpretation, not planning judgment requiring deference to either party’s view. The injunction issue therefore did not arise. In any event, Class Q meant there would be no breach of planning control on which an injunction could operate.