West Lindsey District Council, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For Defence & Anor

Interim relief in a public law claim is governed by the American Cyanamid approach, adapted where public interests are engaged. The claimant must show a serious issue to be tried, but the court may undertake a preliminary assessment of the merits where that is necessary to evaluate the public interest. Damages will often be inadequate where the dispute concerns accommodation for persons at risk of destitution. The decisive question remains the balance of convenience and justice. A local planning authority cannot readily establish that local planning policies or a proposed redevelopment scheme were mandatory considerations in a ministerial decision to use Crown land for asylum accommodation. Nor is it necessarily irrational to proceed on the assumption that further planning permission may be granted. The court refused interim relief and left expedition to be considered after acknowledgment of service.

West Lindsey District Council sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to use RAF Scampton, Crown land owned by the Ministry of Defence, to accommodate asylum seekers. It applied for an interim injunction restraining preparatory works, movement onto the site and acquisition, or alternatively for an expedited final hearing.

The council alleged failure to take account of mandatory relevant considerations, irrationality, absence of an emergency for the purposes of Class Q permitted development, and inadequate reasons. The Secretary of State relied on the statutory bar in section 296A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the reasoning in Braintree District Council v Secretary of State for the Home Department, and the public interest in providing accommodation. The central issue was whether interim relief should preserve the site pending determination of the claim.

1. Interim relief refused. The application was governed by the American Cyanamid test, with appropriate weight given to public interests.
2. There was a serious issue to be tried, but the grounds appeared difficult. Section 296A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 might operate as a jurisdictional or discretionary bar, or at least materially affect the balance of convenience, because the application could be viewed as an attempt to circumvent the statutory restriction on enforcement steps concerning Crown land.
3. The challenge based on mandatory relevant considerations was weak. Subject to express statutory provision and the high irrationality threshold, the decision-maker generally selects the considerations regarded as material. It was not necessarily irrational to take an optimistic view that planning permission would later be granted and to accept the risk that it might not.
4. The irrationality challenge faced the high Wednesbury threshold. The Secretary of State could rationally treat the use of Crown land to accommodate persons whom she had a statutory duty to house as an available option. Government documents also showed consideration of alternatives and value-for-money issues.
5. The Class Q argument that there was no emergency was difficult. The court ordinarily treated decisions of judges of coordinate jurisdiction as correct unless there was good reason to depart. The decision in Braintree was not shown to contain a glaring or obvious flaw, and permission to appeal did not itself justify disregarding it.
6. The reasons challenge was also weak. The publicly stated reasons, together with the documents disclosed in the proceedings, were intelligible and adequate and disclosed no manifest inconsistency.
7. Damages were inadequate for either side. The decisive balance favoured the Secretary of State. The need to provide accommodation, the temporary and reversible nature of the works, the absence of planning permission for the council’s scheme, the lack of evidence from the proposed developer, and the Crown’s ownership of the land outweighed the council’s concerns.
8. The council had not delayed unduly. The papers were directed to a Planning Court judge within 48 hours after acknowledgment of service, who could decide any further directions, including expedition.