Transport for London v Persons Unknown & Ors

An anticipatory injunction requires a strong probability that the defendant will breach the claimant’s rights and that the resulting harm will be grave and irreparable, so that damages are inadequate. Where protest engages Articles 10 or 11, the court must assess legality, legitimate aim and necessity, including proportionality. The balancing exercise is fact-specific. Significant disruption intended to coerce others, rather than merely resulting incidentally from protest, may weigh substantially in favour of relief. A final injunction against persons unknown must also satisfy the applicable identification, notice and procedural safeguards. Relief may be limited by location, duration and existing injunctions so that it remains necessary and proportionate.

Transport for London sought final injunctions against persons unknown and 168 named defendants in response to disruptive Just Stop Oil protests on specified GLA Roads. The proposed order prohibited blocking, slowing, obstructing or otherwise interfering with traffic, but did not prohibit slow marching. Interim injunctions had previously been granted in the same proceedings, and related injunctions had been made in proceedings concerning Insulate Britain.

By trial, most named defendants had given undertakings or were no longer subject to the claim. The issues were whether there was a sufficiently strong probability of further breaches, whether damages were inadequate, whether the conduct was protected by Articles 10 and 11, whether the proposed injunction was proportionate, and whether final relief could properly be granted against persons unknown.

1. Injunction requirements. There was a strong probability that, absent relief, the remaining named defendants and persons unknown would resume or initiate road blockages at the specified locations. The evidence included previous conduct, continued commitment to civil disobedience, absence of disavowal and, for non-participating defendants, failure to engage with the proceedings. Road blockages would cause grave and irreparable harm, including unquantifiable personal and economic disruption and diversion of finite public resources, making damages inadequate (paras 29–41).
2. Convention rights. Participation in the protests engaged Articles 10 and 11. The injunction constituted an interference prescribed by law under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and the claimant’s rights and duties under the Highways Act 1980. The interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others (paras 42–46).
3. Proportionality. The aim was sufficiently important, the injunction had a rational connection with it, and no less restrictive effective measure was available. In the final balance, weight was given to the importance of protest and the seriousness of the subject matter, but also to the widespread and substantial disruption, effects on emergency vehicles, use of public resources, risk of disorder, and the fact that disruption was an intended coercive objective rather than an incidental side-effect. The order prohibited only specified conduct at limited locations and preserved protest elsewhere, including slow marching at the specified locations. It was therefore proportionate and struck a fair balance (paras 47–54).
4. Persons unknown and form of order. The Canada Goose guidelines were satisfied, justifying final relief against persons unknown. A five-year injunction with annual review and liberty to apply was proportionate. Defendants already subject to the Insulate Britain injunction were confined to the six locations not covered by that order, avoiding duplication and uncertainty (paras 56–64).
5. An injunction in the proposed terms, subject to those modifications, was granted against the remaining named defendants and persons unknown. The provisional view was that the defendants subject to the injunction should pay the claimant’s costs (paras 64–65).