The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Enfield v Charles Snell & Ors

A final injunction against persons unknown may be granted under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 where there is a compelling justification to protect civil rights, damages are inadequate, and the order is clearly defined and procedurally fair.

For a quia timet injunction, the claimant must show a strong probability of future breach, grave and irreparable harm, and an imminent and real risk. A newcomer injunction must be necessary, proportionate, territorially and temporally limited, supported by full and frank disclosure, and accompanied by generous rights to apply to vary or discharge it.

The Council owned land adjoining the Lee Navigation within the Meridian Water Regeneration Project. Several defendants had occupied the riverbank by mooring boats or living in structures there. Interim injunctions were granted in 2024, after which the named defendants left and did not return.

At trial, the Council sought final relief against the named defendants and a final injunction against persons unknown to prevent trespass, nuisance and anti-social behaviour during infrastructure works. The central issues were whether the injunction against persons unknown was justified, whether its terms satisfied substantive and procedural safeguards, and whether a power of arrest should be attached.

1. Disposition. The final injunction was granted against persons unknown, subject to amendment of its terms. The named defendants were discharged from the proceedings because the interim injunctions had achieved their purpose and there was no evidence that they had returned or threatened to return.
2. Standing and substantive rights. Under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972, the Council had standing to protect the interests of inhabitants. As riparian owner, it was entitled to access to and egress from the non-tidal Lee Navigation. There was no common-law public right of navigation on that stretch. Mooring vessels or erecting structures in the relevant area would therefore constitute trespass and nuisance in the circumstances of the works.
3. Injunction principles. The ordinary American Cyanamid approach did not apply to a final injunction. A quia timet injunction required a strong probability of future breach, grave and irreparable harm, and an imminent and real risk. For persons unknown, there had to be a compelling justification for protecting the claimant’s civil rights, and damages had to be inadequate.
4. Application. The evidence established a real likelihood of renewed occupation, the absence of any public right of navigation, and the practical impossibility of reconstructing the canal embankment while vessels were present. Delays would materially affect the infrastructure works and the wider project. Damages were inadequate because future trespassers were unidentified, mooring could be transient, and disruption and safety risks were difficult to quantify.
5. Safeguards. The persons unknown were clearly identified by the prohibited conduct and geographical boundaries. The prohibitions matched the pleaded torts, were expressed in clear language, and did not prohibit conduct which was lawful viewed in isolation. The injunction was limited to 31 March 2027, with alternative service methods and a right to apply to vary or discharge it.
6. Power of arrest. The statutory conditions were not met because the evidence did not establish violence, threatened violence or a significant risk of harm to a person. No power of arrest was attached.