The Mayor and Burgess of the London Borough of Richmond-upon-Thames v Alistair Trotman

A local authority may obtain a final injunction to restrain a public nuisance caused by a vessel that materially and unreasonably obstructs access to its riverbank, even where navigation legislation permits reasonable temporary anchoring or mooring. The statutory navigation right does not confer a right to maintain a permanent obstruction. The court must exercise caution where byelaws create criminal penalties, but injunctive relief remains a matter of judgment assessed by the frequency and severity of the infringement. A power of arrest requires the statutory conditions, including violence or a significant risk of harm; nuisance alone is insufficient. An Article 8 defence concerning a vessel used as a home must be properly pleaded and supported by evidence of an exceptional case.

The claimant local authority brought a Part 8 claim for a prohibitory injunction preventing the defendant from mooring or anchoring vessels adjacent to its riverbanks. An interim injunction had been granted by Lambert J on 11 July 2023. Related appeals were dismissed on the papers on 16 November 2023. Permission for separate judicial review proceedings concerning enforcement activity was also refused as totally without merit.

At the final trial, the claimant relied on trespass, breaches of its mooring byelaws, public nuisance and anti-social behaviour. The defendant relied on statutory navigation rights and denied attaching his houseboat, Kupe, to the claimant’s land. The central issues were whether the evidence established trespass or byelaw breaches, whether the vessel and its anchor ropes constituted a public nuisance, whether the claimant had standing, and whether a power of arrest or Article 8 protection was justified.

1. Navigation rights. Section 79 of the Thames Conservancy Act 1932 made it lawful to navigate the Thames for pleasure or profit. It also included a right to anchor, moor or remain stationary for a reasonable time in the ordinary course of pleasure navigation, subject to byelaws. Those provisions did not regulate the relationship between navigators and riparian owners, and did not authorise a permanent or material obstruction.
2. Trespass and byelaws. The claimant failed to establish significant trespass or prolonged mooring in breach of Byelaw 4(a). Contact between Kupe and overhanging tree growth did not amount to mooring to the land without physical attachment, and the gangplank was not proved to have attached the vessel to the riverbank. The byelaws were nevertheless legally valid and enforceable.
3. Public nuisance and standing. Kupe and its anchor ropes had remained within three metres of the riverbank for more than six months and created an unreasonable, non-trifling obstruction. Other river users were prevented from reaching the bank. That constituted a public nuisance. Under section 222(1) of the Local Government Act 1972, the claimant had standing to bring proceedings in its own name to protect inhabitants’ interests. The approach in Couper and others v Albion Properties Ltd, Port of London Authority and Hutchison Whampoa Properties (Europe) Ltd [2013] EWHC 2993 (Ch) was applied.
4. Injunction. The existence of criminal penalties under the byelaws required caution, but did not prevent civil injunctive relief. The sustained obstruction justified a final injunction. The Article 8 point was not properly pleaded or particularised, and there was no evidence that the defendant could not reside on Kupe elsewhere while complying with the byelaws.
5. Power of arrest. Although the statutory framework in section 27 of the Police and Justice Act 2006 applied, the claimant had not shown violence, threatened violence or a significant risk of harm. No power of arrest was therefore attached.
6. Order. The defendant was prohibited indefinitely from bringing, mooring or leaving any vessel so that any part came within three metres of a council-owned Richmond-upon-Thames riverbank, unless the mooring complied with the 2015 byelaws. Costs were summarily assessed at £27,500.

• Interim stage: Lambert J granted an interim injunction on 11 July 2023.
• Related judicial review: Permission was refused on 3 October 2023 and the claim was declared totally without merit.
• Court of Appeal: The defendant’s appeals against the interim injunction and bail conditions were dismissed on the papers on 16 November 2023 and declared totally without merit.
• Present proceedings: Following the final substantive trial, the High Court granted a narrower final injunction and refused a power of arrest.