Cambridge City Council v Traditional Cambridge Tours Ltd & Ors

Unauthorised commercial operations on land comprising a public highway may constitute trespass where the use is unreasonable. Establishing a business, organising customers, obstructing or inconveniencing other users, and facilitating unlawful activity are relevant indicators.

A landowner may seek a civil injunction even where related conduct may also engage the criminal law or fall within another authority’s regulatory jurisdiction. A quia timet injunction may be granted where future trespass is both imminent and real, particularly where previous preventative measures have failed and repeated applications would be required. A public authority acting to protect public amenity may obtain such relief without a cross-undertaking in damages.

The Council owned or controlled several sites beside the River Cam, including Garrett Hostel Lane and Quayside. It alleged that the defendants operated unauthorised commercial punt tours from those sites and sought an interim injunction restraining trespass.

The first defendant admitted operating a commercial punt business from Garrett Hostel Lane without the Council’s permission and without registration by the Cam Conservators. The defendants argued that the claim was inadequately pleaded, that regulation of river use belonged exclusively to the Conservators, that criminal remedies were sufficient, and that the balance of convenience favoured awaiting trial.

The central issues were whether the activity constituted trespass, whether civil injunctive relief was available, and whether a wider quia timet injunction should restrain future unauthorised operations.

1. Trespass and highway use. Applying DPP v Jones [1999] 2 AC 240 and Iveagh v Martin [1961] 1 QB 232, use of a highway must be reasonable and consistent with the public’s right of passage. Establishing and operating a commercial punt station on the Council’s land without consent was unreasonable use. The crowds, obstruction or inconvenience, unauthorised pontoon, safety concerns and connection with unlawful river activity reinforced that conclusion. The first defendant, as a company, was capable of committing trespass.
2. The claim form and particulars adequately identified the Council’s land, the alleged trespass and the injunction sought. The distinction between highway and private land did not make the pleading defective.
3. The Conservators’ jurisdiction over navigation and their byelaws did not prevent the Council protecting its adjoining land. The Council was entitled to bring proceedings for trespass independently of enforcement on the river.
4. Section 137 of the Highways Act 1980 was not a suitable alternative remedy because the claim concerned unreasonable use of the Council’s land, rather than merely wilful obstruction. In any event, civil relief remained appropriate where previous measures and criminal enforcement had failed and the defendants intended to persist. The Council was empowered to institute proceedings under section 222 of the Local Government Act 1972.
5. The court declined to resolve disputed personal liability of the individual defendants at the interim stage. The first defendant’s admitted trespass was sufficient.
6. Under section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, a proprietor whose rights were being wrongfully interfered with and whose wrong was likely to continue was prima facie entitled to an injunction. Damages were inadequate because the Council sought regulation of land use, not monetary compensation.
7. For the wider quia timet relief, the risk of future trespass was imminent and real. The history of operators moving between sites, failed preventative measures, continued disregard of the law, the ease of evading an order limited to one defendant, the Council’s public functions and the protection of public amenity justified an injunction covering all Claim Locations and persons unknown.
8. The interim injunction was granted against the first defendant and persons unknown. It prohibited unauthorised commercial punting operations at any Claim Location, pending trial or further order. No cross-undertaking in damages was required.