David Hamon and Ors v University College London

A court may stay proceedings under CPR 3.1(2)(f) to encourage ADR, even without a contractual obligation to use ADR and despite a party’s opposition. The discretion is informed by the overriding objective and the need to save costs and court resources, but must be exercised proportionately.

For large, low-value group claims, a stay may be appropriate where a statute-backed complaints scheme could resolve some or all claims. The court must nevertheless consider whether the proposed process can address practical issues, including volume, delay, claimant-specific information and quantum. A Group Litigation Order should not be determined until the parties identify the information needed to distinguish common issues from cohort-specific issues.

The claimants, current and former UCL students, brought proposed group claims for breach of contract concerning cancelled or online teaching and restricted access to facilities during strike action and the Covid-19 pandemic. They applied for a Group Litigation Order under CPR 19.22.

UCL applied under CPR 3.1(2)(f) for a stay to enable use of the UCL complaints process and the Office of the Independent Adjudicator scheme. The central issues were whether a stay should be ordered to facilitate ADR and, consequentially, whether the GLO application could be determined before the claims were sufficiently particularised and grouped.

1. Stay ordered. The court ordered an eight-month stay from hand-down, with permission to apply after four months. The stay was intended to encourage constructive ADR, rather than to compel the claimants to use the OIA scheme or any particular process.
2. CPR 3.1(2)(f), read with CPR 1.4(2)(e), gives the court power to stay proceedings for ADR. That power is not confined to cases involving a contractual ADR clause and may be exercised even where a party opposes ADR. A stay does not itself deny access to justice because the claims may continue if ADR fails.
3. The OIA scheme was not designed to adjudicate contested legal rights. That limitation did not make it unsuitable as ADR: settlement may be achieved for commercial or practical reasons, and another process, such as mediation, could take account of legal merits. However, the court accepted concerns that the OIA process might focus on whether UCL acted reasonably in changing delivery, without addressing whether charging full fees for restricted provision was reasonable.
4. The discretion required a balance between the likely costs and duration of group litigation and the risks of delay, expense and ineffective resolution through the proposed ADR route. UCL had not provided sufficiently concrete proposals addressing the volume of complaints, available resources, assessment of quantum and the grouping of similar claims. Those matters justified permission to apply during the stay and required active co-operation by both parties.
5. The GLO application was adjourned. It could not properly be determined until the parties supplied proposals identifying claimant-specific information, cohorts with similar contractual and factual circumstances, and suitably formulated GLO issues. The court indicated that separate prosecution of the claims as individual actions would be disproportionate.