Dejaun Wilson v Stroud Green Housing Co-operative Ltd

Permission to appeal from a discretionary case-management order requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. An appellate court should interfere only for a material legal or procedural error, failure to consider relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, or a decision outside the reasonable range.

A pre-action protocol provision stating that parties should apply for a stay does not require a stay whenever proceedings are issued before pre-action steps are complete. The court may weigh the need for prompt progress, the stage reached, the parties’ conduct and the interests of informing the defendant of the claim. Encouraging ADR does not justify an automatic lengthy stay, particularly where a defamation claim has made little progress.

The appellant brought defamation proceedings concerning an email sent by the respondent to a local authority. He issued the claim shortly before expiry of the four-month period for serving the claim form, but had not served particulars of claim. He applied for a 12-month stay to pursue an internal complaints process and settlement.

Deputy Master Skinner KC dismissed the stay application, ordered service of particulars of claim and summarily assessed costs. Mrs Justice Eady refused permission to appeal on the papers. The appellant renewed his application before Mrs Justice Hill, challenging the exercise of discretion and alleging failures to consider limitation, pre-action protocols and ADR, including Hamon. The central issue was whether the proposed appeal had a real prospect of success or another compelling reason to be heard.

1. Permission and appellate restraint. Under CPR 52.6(1), permission requires a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason. An appellate court will interfere with a discretionary evaluation only for a misdirection in law, procedural unfairness or irregularity, taking account of irrelevant matters, failure to take account of relevant matters, or a plainly wrong decision outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. The need to uphold robust case-management decisions creates a high hurdle.
2. Nature of the stay application. The Deputy Master understood that the application was for a stay, with an ancillary application concerning service of particulars of claim. Considering the one-year limitation period for defamation was relevant context. A proposed 12-month stay was extraordinary in a claim subject to a one-year limitation period, and the absence of any letter of claim, particulars or notice of the claim’s parameters justified concern about delay and lack of progress.
3. Pre-action process and ADR. Paragraph 17 of the Practice Direction for Pre-Action Conduct did not create a rule that a stay must be granted whenever proceedings were issued before pre-action procedures were completed. The weight given to the respondent’s conduct and the appellant’s frustration was a matter for the Deputy Master. Negotiations, mediation or other ADR could continue alongside the litigation, and a later stay application remained possible.
4. Hamon. The first-instance decision in Hamon, involving group litigation and a breach of contract claim subject to a longer limitation period, applied general ADR principles to its own facts. It was not authority for a lengthy stay in every case, or in defamation cases with comparable lack of progress. It therefore provided limited assistance.
5. Disposition. None of the grounds disclosed an arguable discretionary error. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused because the appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for it to be heard.

1. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Deputy Master Skinner KC dismissed the application for a stay, ordered the appellant to file and serve particulars of claim, and ordered payment of costs on 13 June 2024.
2. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Mrs Justice Eady refused permission to appeal on the papers on 14 March 2025.
3. High Court (King’s Bench Division): Mrs Justice Hill refused the renewed application for permission to appeal on 19 June 2025.