Anna Christie v Mary Ward Legal Centre & Anor

On a summary-judgment application, a solicitor’s reliance on specialist counsel’s advice cannot be determined conclusively without examining the solicitor’s own expertise and the evidence reasonably available at trial. A solicitor must exercise independent judgment and reject advice that is obviously or glaringly wrong, but the reasonableness of reliance depends on context, including the solicitor’s experience in the relevant field. Where further factual investigation could affect the outcome, the issue may have to proceed to trial.

The claimant appealed against Master McCloud’s decision granting the first defendants, her former solicitors, summary judgment on a professional-negligence claim. The Master held that, even assuming negligent and causative advice, the solicitors could rely on advice from the second defendant barrister and defeat the claim. The Master had separately rejected limitation arguments, which were subject to another appeal.

The claimant challenged the decision procedurally and substantively. The central substantive issue was whether the reasonableness of the solicitors’ reliance on counsel’s specialist advice was suitable for summary determination.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The procedural ground was rejected, but the substantive ground succeeded. The order granting the first defendants summary judgment was quashed.
2. The claimant had adequate notice that both limitation and reliance were to be addressed at the hearing. The application, skeleton arguments and the claimant’s own skeleton argument all engaged with the reliance issue. The proposed sequencing of limitation before merits did not mean that the reliance issue had been abandoned.
3. The Master had correctly stated the governing reliance principles. A solicitor may generally rely on properly instructed counsel, particularly where the advice is specialist and the solicitor lacks comparable specialist experience. Reliance is not blind: the solicitor must apply independent judgment and reject advice that is obviously or glaringly wrong.
4. The question whether the first defendants were merely generalist solicitors, or held specialist housing and debt expertise, could not confidently be determined on the limited evidence before the Master. Their level of expertise was relevant to whether reliance on counsel was reasonable.
5. The court had to consider evidence reasonably expected to be available at trial. Evidence concerning comparable arrangements with other leaseholders might affect whether the solicitors should have explored an alternative to sale. The competing factual issues were not suitable for summary adjudication.
6. Further directions were to be sought from Soole J, whose decision on limitation would determine the next steps. Costs were left for agreement or written submissions.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division) [2023] EWHC 1814 (KB): the procedural ground was rejected, but the substantive appeal was allowed and the summary-judgment order was quashed.
• Master McCloud: granted the first defendants summary judgment on the reliance defence. Her limitation decision is reported at [2022] P.N.L.R 25.
• High Court, permission stage: Ritchie J granted permission to appeal on both issues on 16 February 2023.