Mark Randolph Dyer & Anor v Patricia Webb & Ors

Interim injunctions restraining neighbours from making planning objections or engaging in harassment were refused. Where proposed relief would interfere with Convention rights, the applicant must satisfy the court that it is likely to establish at trial that the conduct was unreasonable and that the restriction is justified and proportionate. Genuine and meritorious planning objections, even if upsetting, ordinarily remain protected expression and association. The court must also consider adequacy of damages and the balance of the risk of injustice. A pre-action injunction requires urgency or a sufficient interests-of-justice basis. The seriousness of injunction proceedings, including the risk of contempt or imprisonment, requires a clear evidential foundation.

The claimants sought interim injunctions against four neighbouring respondents. They alleged that the respondents had used the planning process to harass them and had engaged in other acts of harassment. The proposed restrictions included restraints on planning objections, concerted discussion of those objections, high-hedge complaints and other alleged conduct.

The application was made before the intended substantive claim had been issued. The court considered separately the proposed interference with the respondents’ rights under arts 10 and 11 of the Convention and the conventional interim injunction test for alleged harassment. It also considered whether pre-issue relief was urgent or otherwise desirable in the interests of justice.

1. The applications were dismissed. The planning-objection injunction failed on each of the three limbs identified by the court: the threshold test, adequacy of damages and balance of convenience. The injunction against other alleged harassment also failed on each limb.
2. Planning objections and discussion of them prima facie engage freedom of expression and freedoms of assembly and association. The court had to interpret the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 compatibly with Convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.
3. For the planning-objection application, the ordinary serious-issue threshold was modified by Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3). The claimants had to show that they were likely to establish at trial that the respondents would not prove that their conduct was reasonable. The court also had to apply proportionality and give particular weight to freedom of expression.
4. The evidence did not show that the objections were spurious, unmeritorious or malicious. A high-hedge complaint had been upheld by both the local authority and an inspector. The planning consultant relied upon by the claimants lacked independence, and the underlying planning material did not establish that the objections were objectively invalid. Genuine disagreement about development in an area of outstanding natural beauty was materially different from oppressive conduct intended to cause distress.
5. The court applied the conventional American Cyanamid test to the other harassment allegations. The historic conversations, disputed incidents, allegations concerning Mr Baker, the Velvets Cottage events and the process-server incident did not provide a realistic prospect of establishing a course of conduct amounting to harassment. The evidence was weak, hearsay or insufficiently connected to the claimants.
6. Damages were an adequate remedy. The balance of convenience, properly understood as the balance of the risk of injustice, also favoured refusal. The proposed restraints would expose the respondents to serious consequences, including contempt proceedings, for using lawful planning channels.
7. Because the claim had not been issued, Civil Procedure Rules 1998, rule 25.2(2)(b), additionally required urgency or a sufficient interests-of-justice basis. Neither was established.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.