Leeds City Council v Persons Unknown

The statutory route to the Supreme Court for a decision in a criminal cause or matter is confined to proceedings in which criminal punishment is the direct outcome of the proceeding itself. Criminal consequences arising only from a later breach of a civil order do not satisfy that test. Statutory definitions of “cause” and “matter” do not displace this approach.

Certification of a point of law of general public importance is a freestanding requirement. Even where that threshold is met, permission to appeal should be refused unless the High Court considers that the point ought to be considered by the Supreme Court.

This was a consequential judgment following the court’s earlier decision, [2023] EWHC 1504 (Admin). The Council sought an extension of time, permission to appeal to the Supreme Court and certification of points of law under section 1 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.

The Council argued that the earlier decision was a decision of the High Court in a criminal cause or matter. It relied on the fact that the underlying proceedings had been before magistrates and that breach of a Closure Notice or Closure Order could have criminal consequences. The central questions were whether the statutory jurisdictional test was met and whether permission should be granted.

1. The decision was not in a criminal cause or matter. The governing question is whether the proceeding itself places an individual in jeopardy of criminal punishment as its direct outcome. Proceedings concerning an order which is not itself punishment do not become criminal merely because a later, separate breach may attract criminal consequences.
2. The approach in Amand was adopted in McCann and coherently explained in McGuinness. Anti-social behaviour order proceedings were not criminal cause or matter proceedings because conviction and punishment arose only if the order was subsequently breached in separate proceedings. The same reasoning applied to Closure Notices and Closure Orders.
3. The statutory definitions in section 151 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not alter the conclusion. The Supreme Court had considered those definitions, and they did not undermine the established approach.
4. Certification was considered as a freestanding issue. The court accepted that the identified questions concerning the meaning of premises and the scope of a Closure Order were points of law of general public importance. Nevertheless, permission to appeal was refused because the court would not have certified that the points ought to be considered by the Supreme Court, even if the jurisdictional condition had been satisfied.
5. The extension of time was granted. The court declared that the earlier decision was not a decision of the High Court in a criminal cause or matter, while certifying the two identified points of law for the purposes of section 1 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.

The judgment was a sequel to the same court’s earlier decision, [2023] EWHC 1504 (Admin). The Council attempted to pursue a civil second appeal in the Court of Appeal, but that route was closed by the Civil Appeals Office as barred by the Senior Courts Act 1981. It then sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court under the Administration of Justice Act 1960.