Rafal Drozdowski v Regional Court in Warsaw, Poland & Anor

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court asks whether the extradition judge reached the wrong decision, rather than conducting the proportionality assessment afresh. Errors or omissions in the reasoning do not suffice unless the outcome was wrong.

Article 8 requires the interference with private and family life to be balanced against the substantial public interest in extradition. The seriousness of the alleged offences, previous serious offending, delay, mental health, children’s best interests and the consequences of separation are relevant. Post-Brexit uncertainty about re-entry must be assessed by reference to the individual’s actual immigration position and applicable rules, not assumption.

The appellant appealed under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a Westminster Magistrates’ Court order for his extradition to Poland under two accusation European arrest warrants. The warrants concerned alleged violence, participation in an organised criminal group, drug and forged-banknote offences, firearms possession and armed robbery dating from 2004.

The District Judge rejected passage-of-time and article 8 objections. The appellant challenged the assessment of delay, expert evidence concerning the effect of separation on his children, and uncertainty about re-entry to the United Kingdom after Brexit. He also sought to rely on fresh evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under sections 26 and 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the appellate question was whether the District Judge’s decision was wrong. The High Court was not required to repeat the balancing exercise merely because the judgment could have given fuller reasons.
2. The District Judge had adequately signposted and incorporated his findings on delay, mental health and family circumstances when addressing article 8. There was no need to repeat all the evidence in the proportionality section.
3. The 17-year delay was properly treated as a factor against extradition. The District Judge was entitled to find that the delay arose from evidential difficulties and the complexity of the organised-crime investigation, rather than culpable delay by the Polish authorities. Rutkowski and Others v Poland concerned delay in judicial procedures and did not establish culpable delay in this case.
4. The District Judge separately considered the position of both children and accepted that separation would not be in their best interests. He was nevertheless entitled to conclude that the substantial public interest in extradition, the seriousness of the alleged offences and the appellant’s previous serious offending carried greater weight. The evidence concerning the younger child and the possible deterioration in the mother’s mental health did not demonstrate that the proportionality conclusion was wrong.
5. Uncertainty about re-entry after Brexit was properly treated as a factor against extradition. The appellant had not established his actual immigration status or shown that the relevant post-Brexit guidance would apply. The court should not assume refusal of entry, particularly where any risk might result from previous convictions and immigration-rule changes rather than extradition itself. The approach in Pink v Poland was accepted.
6. The fresh evidence did not satisfy section 27(4) of the Extradition Act 2003. It would not have caused the District Judge to decide any question differently or to order discharge. The evidence was refused and the extradition order remained in force.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal against the Westminster Magistrates’ Court decision of 4 January 2022 dismissed.