Nicolae Prejoinau v Deputy General Prosecutor of Messina (Italy)

For the purposes of the double-jeopardy bar in section 12 of the Extradition Act 2003, extradition may be barred where the requested prosecution is founded on the same or substantially the same facts as an earlier prosecution and would ordinarily constitute an abuse of process. The bar does not arise where the foreign prosecution concerns materially wider conduct, victims and periods, and expressly excludes conduct already punished in the earlier proceedings. A foreign court’s assessment of its own sentence is not ordinarily open to review. A requested person must show compelling evidence before the strong presumption that a requesting state will comply with specialty obligations is displaced. An extradition warrant may be read with further information and the foreign judgment when assessing particularisation.

The appellant appealed, with permission, against District Judge Ikram’s order of 24 September 2021 directing his extradition to Italy under a conviction European Arrest Warrant. He had been convicted in Italy of multiple human-trafficking and associated offences and sentenced to 16 years and six months.

He had previously been convicted in Romania of trafficking two women between December 2007 and June 2008. The central issues were whether section 12 of the Extradition Act 2003 barred extradition on double-jeopardy or abuse-of-process grounds, whether Charges 1 and 5 were sufficiently particularised under section 2, and whether there was a sufficient risk of breach of specialty under section 17.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant was not extradited for, and Italy was required to exclude from punishment, conduct concerning the two Romanian victims for which he had already been convicted and imprisoned.
2. Under section 12 of the Extradition Act 2003, the relevant question was whether a notional prosecution in England for the Italian conduct would be founded on the same or substantially the same facts as the Romanian prosecution so as ordinarily to require a stay as an abuse of process. The conduct was not identical. The Italian proceedings concerned many more victims, a wider period and wider criminal activity. The Italian Court of Appeal had expressly excluded the Romanian conduct and reduced the sentence accordingly.
3. The court declined to infer that the Romanian authorities had deliberately abandoned a viable prosecution concerning the other victims. The circumstances also differed materially from Fofana. The Romanian and Italian prosecutions were conducted by separate sovereign prosecuting authorities, and that difference would in any event amount to a special circumstance for the purposes of the abuse-of-process approach.
4. The double-jeopardy argument based on European Union law was not determined. Fofana, a Divisional Court decision, was followed, and the point had not been fully argued. The court considered that Fofana stated a more favourable test for the appellant than the European Union concept of acts being inextricably linked.
5. Charges 1 and 5 were sufficiently particularised. The European Arrest Warrant, further information and Italian judgment could be read together. They identified the alleged conduct, time, place and the appellant’s personal role with sufficient clarity. Whether he could have continued offending while in custody was an evidential issue for the Italian courts.
6. There were effective specialty arrangements with Italy under Article 27 of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision. The presumption that a Member State would comply with its international obligations was not displaced by Professor Maffei’s evidence. No compelling evidence of a likely breach had been shown.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the decision of District Judge Ikram dated 24 September 2021; appeal dismissed.