Episo 4 Pilgrim Holding SARL & Anor v Timothy Davies

Permission to bring private committal proceedings for knowingly false statements requires a strong prima facie case that the statement was false and knowingly so, together with a public interest in pursuing the proceedings. The court must consider the statement’s significance, the maker’s understanding of its likely effect, the seriousness of the alleged contempt, proportionality, available remedies and the overriding objective.

A strong prima facie case does not compel permission. Where the false evidence caused no material prejudice beyond recoverable or potentially recoverable costs, was substantially corrected, and committal proceedings would consume disproportionate court resources after the substantive litigation had ended, permission may properly be refused.

The Applicants sought permission under CPR 81.3(5)(b) to bring committal proceedings against Timothy Davies. They alleged that he knowingly made false statements in two witness statements filed in security for costs applications concerning TB Property Investments (Plymouth) Limited.

The statements concerned Mr Davies’s assets, cash, shareholdings, loans and the assets of his wife. The security for costs application succeeded, the claim was later struck out for failure to provide security, and costs were awarded to the Applicants. The central questions were whether there was a strong prima facie case of knowingly false statements and, if so, whether pursuing committal proceedings was in the public interest and consistent with the overriding objective.

1. Strong prima facie case. The court found a strong prima facie case that all nine identified statements were untrue. Several statements were admitted to be false. The remaining statements were strongly prima facie false because assets, properties, pension interests, loans and an overdraft facility had been omitted or inaccurately described.
2. Knowledge and intention. The relevant mental element was knowledge that the statements were untrue, not mere recklessness, applying the approach in Norman v Adler [2023] EWCA Civ 785. The all-encompassing wording of the statements, the number of inaccuracies, the public availability of some information, the timing of later corrections and the threatening correspondence together established a strong prima facie case of knowledge. There was also a strong prima facie case that Mr Davies intended to mislead the court about the assets available to him.
3. Public interest and proportionality. The principles in Barnes v Seabrook [2010] EWHC 1849 (Admin) and KJM Superbikes Limited v Hinton [2008] EWCA Civ 1280 required careful consideration of the strength and significance of the alleged falsehoods, their effect on the proceedings, the maker’s state of mind, public deterrence and the resources required. Permission should not be granted too freely. The court also applied Stobart v Elliott [2014] EWCA Civ 564 and considered the caution at the permission stage described in Frain v Reeves [2023] EWHC 73 (Ch).
4. Refusal of permission. Although the allegations were serious, the principal uncorrected omission was corrected shortly after the security hearing. The security application had decisively succeeded, the proceedings had ended, and the Applicants’ identifiable prejudice was limited to costs. Committal proceedings could not properly be used to recover or induce compensation for wasted costs; a costs application under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 51, was available. A realistic three-day committal hearing in an already pressured Commercial Court would be disproportionate and contrary to the public interest and overriding objective. Permission was refused.