Simon Kevin Frain & Anor v Louise Michelle Reeves & Anor

Permission to commence committal proceedings is a public-law, public-interest decision. In alleged false-statement cases, the applicant must show a strong prima facie case, to the criminal standard, that the statement was false, was known to be false or made recklessly, and was likely to interfere with the administration of justice. The court may critically assess the evidence at the permission stage, but must not determine the merits. Where more than one reasonable inference is available, the threshold is not met. The court should also consider proportionality, correction of the statement, prior adverse consequences, the risk of vindictive litigation and the overriding objective. Findings from earlier proceedings are generally inadmissible against a non-party to prove facts in issue.

Bill Reeves and Ryan McKinnon applied for permission to commence separate committal proceedings against Louise Reeves and Daniel Curnock. They alleged that Louise had knowingly or recklessly made false statements in pleadings and disclosure statements, and that Mr Curnock had done so in a witness statement, all verified by statements of truth.

The applications arose from probate proceedings concerning the validity of the Deceased’s 2014 Will. In Reeves v Drew & Ors [2022] EWHC 159 (Ch), the court pronounced for an earlier will and made adverse findings about the defendants’ evidence, without finding fraud or conspiracy. The central issues were whether there was a strong prima facie case to the criminal standard, whether the earlier judgment could be relied on, and whether committal proceedings would be in the public interest and proportionate.

Permission refused and both committal applications dismissed.

1. Applicable approach. Permission under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 required consideration of whether proceedings should be brought in the public interest. The applicants had to show a strong prima facie case, to the criminal standard, that the statements were false, that the makers knew this or were reckless, and that they knew or intended that the statements were likely to interfere with the administration of justice. The court could critically evaluate the evidence at this stage, without deciding the merits.
2. Inference and evidence. The evidence had to be viewed as a whole. Where more than one reasonable inference was available, including an innocent inference inconsistent with contempt, the strong prima facie threshold was not met. The applicants’ case relied on speculation about forgotten meetings, emails, texts and telephone calls. It did not establish an obvious inference of dishonesty or recklessness against either defendant.
3. Underlying judgment. The applicants had described the probate judgment as background and said that their applications stood independently on the documents and communications. It was therefore unfair to allow them to use adverse findings in that judgment to bolster allegations which were not clearly advanced in the applications. The application had to identify, within its four corners, the case and evidence the alleged contemnors had to meet.
4. Admissibility against Mr Curnock. Applying the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587, the probate judgment was inadmissible against Mr Curnock, who had not been a party to those proceedings. No fairness justification displaced that rule. He had been unrepresented, had been unable to shape the issues or challenge the evidence, and had not been able to make submissions on his integrity.
5. Individual allegations. In relation to Louise, the meaning of the word “know” depended on context and could refer to substantial familiarity or an established business relationship, rather than any brief meeting. The disclosure allegations were also weak: the emails had already been disclosed before the relevant statement, and the telephone and text evidence did not establish the necessary mental element. Mr Curnock had made the statement years after a fleeting encounter, without access to the relevant emails, and there was no evidence that he appreciated its significance or likely effect.
6. Additional considerations. Even if a strong prima facie case had existed, committal would not have been in the public interest or proportionate. The statements had been corrected or exposed before trial, the defendants had been cross-examined, and Louise had suffered substantial adverse consequences. The court also considered the risk of vindictive litigation, the use of court resources and the overriding objective. A solicitor’s statement in probate proceedings did not attract an enhanced duty or enhanced public interest merely because it was described as a Larke v Nugus statement.

This was a first-instance decision on two applications for permission to commence committal proceedings. The judgment records that the underlying probate judgment was challenged unsuccessfully: permission to appeal was refused by Asplin LJ and reconsideration under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 was refused by Lewison LJ.