Northern Lincolnshire & Goole NHS Foundation Trust v Kae Burnell-Chambers & Anor

Permission to bring contempt proceedings should be granted only where there is a strong prima facie case, the public interest requires proceedings, and the proceedings are proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective.

Each alleged ground and particular must be assessed separately. For interference with the administration of justice, the evidence must support an intention to bring about an objectively interfering state of affairs. Mere presence at relevant events is insufficient without particularised acts or evidence of complicity. In contrast, a recently signed witness statement may establish a strong prima facie case of knowingly making false statements where surveillance and the surrounding circumstances support knowledge of falsity and likely interference with justice.

The claimant sought permission under CPR Part 81 to bring committal proceedings against the first defendant and her mother, the second defendant.

The allegations arose from a discontinued clinical negligence claim in which the first defendant had accepted fundamental dishonesty. Against the second defendant, the claimant alleged both interference with the due administration of justice through support for an exaggerated presentation of disability and knowingly making false statements in a witness statement verified by a statement of truth.

The central issues were whether there was a strong prima facie case on each ground, whether committal proceedings were in the public interest, and whether they were proportionate and consistent with the overriding objective.

1. Permission test. Permission under CPR Part 81 required a strong prima facie case, a public interest in bringing proceedings, proportionality and compliance with the overriding objective. The court had to avoid deciding the merits, while critically reviewing the evidence. Each ground and each particular had to be considered separately.
2. Interference ground. The relevant contempt required proof of an intention to bring about a state of affairs which, objectively construed, amounted to interference with the due administration of justice. The surveillance evidence was important but had to be evaluated against each particular and the time at which it occurred. Four particulars relied only on the second defendant’s presence and lacked evidence of words or acts showing complicity. The other particulars involved alleged acts of support but occurred too long before the surveillance evidence to establish the necessary inevitable inference. Permission was therefore refused on this ground.
3. False statement ground. The surveillance, taken about one month after the witness statement was signed, supported a strong prima facie case that the particularised statements were false, that the second defendant knew they were false, and that she understood they were likely to interfere with the course of justice. Relevant factors included the circumstances in which the statement was made, the maker’s state of mind, its significance and use in the proceedings, and the statement of truth.
4. Public interest and proportionality. The seriousness of the alleged contempt, the substantial damages and gratuitous-care claims, the costs incurred and the second defendant’s potential benefit supported a public interest in proceedings. Her age and good character were matters for mitigation if contempt were proved, not matters reducing proportionality. The additional costs and hearing time were not disproportionate.
5. Permission was granted to bring committal proceedings against the second defendant on the false statement ground. Those proceedings were to be heard with the proceedings against the first defendant. Directions were invited from the parties.

First-instance decision. No earlier judicial decision in the same proceedings was identified as being under appeal.